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Articles
Coding Complexity:
Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis
of the Supreme Court
Carolyn Shapiro∗

Introduction
The legal academy has recently experienced a surge of interest in
quantitative empirical analysis. The past few years have seen the
launching of the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, the Society for
Empirical Legal Studies, the Empirical Legal Studies Blog, and the
1
extremely well-attended Conference on Empirical Legal Studies.
Quantitative work by political scientists—sometimes but not always
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Affiliated Scholar, American Bar
Foundation, 2008–09; J.D., M.A. (Public Policy Studies), B.A., University of Chicago. For their helpful
comments, I wish to thank Bernadette Atuahene, Kathy Baker, Jason Czarnezki, Shari Diamond,
David Franklin, Michael Heise, Joshua Karsh, Elizabeth Klein, Harold Krent, Robin Lenhardt, Nancy
Marder, Laura-Beth Nielsen, Richard Posner, Daniel Rothenberg, Matthew Sag, Frederick Schauer,
David Stras, Jerry Thomas, and Noah Zatz, as well as Lisa Bernstein and her students at the
University of Chicago, participants at an American Bar Foundation Research Seminar, participants at
a University of Cincinnati Law School faculty workshop, and participants in a session of the 2006
Midwest Law and Society Retreat. David Franklin and Matthew Sag each went above and beyond the
call of duty and collegiality by recoding a sample of cases. Special thanks are also due to Lee Epstein
and Andrew Martin, who generously and patiently shared their expertise with me and others at the
Conducting Empirical Legal Scholarship workshops at Washington University. Research assistance
was provided by Marcella Hein, Hunter Hogan, LaVonne Meyer, and Patrick Spangler. This Article
could not have been written without the generous support of Chicago-Kent research funds.
1. See generally, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Geoffry P. Miller, Second Annual Conference on
Empirical Legal Studies (CELS): Announcement and Call for Papers (Feb. 6, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=961620; CELS 2009: Announcement and Call for
Papers, http://law.usc.edu/cels/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2009); Cornell Law School: CELS 2008,
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/cels2008/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 14, 2009); Empirical Legal
Studies, www.elsblog.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2009); First Annual Conference on Empirical Legal
Studies: Announcement and Call for Papers, http://www.utexas.edu/law/news/2005/112805_black.html
(last visited Feb. 14, 2009); The Journal of Empirical Legal Studies—Journal Information,
http://www.wiley.com/bw/society.asp?ref=1740-1453&site=1 (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
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coauthored with legal scholars—increasingly appears in the law reviews,
and legal academics increasingly embrace quantitative empirical
3
analysis, often relying on methods and resources developed by social
scientists.
One such resource is the U.S. Supreme Court Database (the
“Database,” “Original Database,” or the “Supreme Court Database”)
and its companion databases (the “databases” or the “Spaeth
4
5
databases”). Created by political scientist Harold Spaeth, the databases
have long been standard resources for political scientists who use
quantitative empirical methods to study the Supreme Court:
The Spaeth databases are so dominating in [political science] that it
would certainly be unusual for a refereed journal to publish a
manuscript whose data derived from an alternate source. Even in the
law reviews, virtually no empirical study of the U.S. Supreme Court
6
produced by political scientists fails to draw on them.
2. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2005); Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickeril, The
Politics of Criminal Justice: How the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice
Jurisprudence, 94 Geo. L.J. 1385, 1385 (2006); Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, The Decisional
Significance of the Chief Justice, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1665, 1665 (2006); Lee Epstein et al., The Political
(Science) Context of Judging, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 783, 783, 812 (2003); Lee Epstein et al., The Role of
Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1145,
1145 (2005); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2002); Mark
David Hall, Jeffersonian Walls and Madisonian Lines: The Supreme Court’s Use of History in the
Religion Clause Cases, 85 Or. L. Rev. 563, 563 (2006); Thomas Hensley & Scott P. Johnson, Unanimity
on the Rehnquist Court, 31 Akron L. Rev. 387, 387 (1998); Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median
Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 1275, 1275, 1284 n.35 (2005); Theodore W.
Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to
Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1150, 1150 (2004); Jeffrey A. Segal &
Chad Westerland, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Judicial Review, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 1323, 1323
(2005); Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court’s Federalism Offensive,
51 Duke L.J. 477, 477 (2001).
3. For discussions chronicling this development, see Frank Cross et al., Above the Rules: A
Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 135, 135 n.2 (2002) (citing Symposium, Empirical
and Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 789 (2002)); Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of
Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 169, 170 (2002); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise,
Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 743,
744–45 (2005); and infra text accompanying notes 7–8.
4. The databases are described in detail below. See infra Part I.A. They are all multi-user
databases that are publicly available. See Supreme Court Data, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/
juri/sctdata.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
5. Harold Spaeth is an emeritus professor of political science at Michigan State University. In
addition to having a Ph.D. in political science and a long and distinguished career in that field, he
holds a J.D. from the University of Michigan. Harold J. Spaeth, Curriculum Vitae (Jan. 31, 2009) (on
file with The Hastings Law Journal).
6. Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of Judging, supra note 2, at 812 (footnote
omitted); see also Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship:
Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 819, 848 (2002) (“‘There is
little doubt that today [Spaeth’s] U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Data Base is the greatest single resource
of data on the Court; there are virtually no social-scientific projects on the Court that fail to draw on
it.’” (quoting Lee Epstein, Social Science, the Courts, and the Law, 83 Judicature 224, 225 (2000))).
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The prominence of Spaeth’s work is increasing in legal academia as
well. A 2006 article reported that between 1993 and 2001 legal scholars
cited Spaeth’s three most seminal books, all coauthored with Jeffrey
Segal, 144 times, but in the shorter time period of 2002 to 2006, there
7
were 161 such references. A more recent Westlaw search for references
to Spaeth in works published between January 2006 and June 2007 alone
identified eighty-five separate articles that rely in some way on Spaeth’s
8
work, and articles relying on data from the Spaeth databases appear in
9
numerous law reviews.
This reliance on the Spaeth databases has its benefits for empirical
legal studies. For example, the use of these publicly-available resources
makes it relatively easy for scholars to replicate results and compare
studies. But as the databases’ use and influence expands in legal
academia, a careful examination of their limitations for the study of law
and legal doctrine is long overdue.
This Article engages in just such an examination of the most
10
prominent of the databases—the Supreme Court Database. Through a
critical analysis of the Database’s coding protocols and a Recoding
Project of a random sample of recent Supreme Court cases, this Article
identifies and explores the Database’s most significant limitations.
Specifically, this Article demonstrates that information about law and
legal doctrine is systematically omitted from the Supreme Court
Database. For example, the Database does not even attempt to identify
legal issues that arise in Supreme Court opinions and, as I will show, it
also does not fully report legal provisions or doctrines relied upon or at
issue.

7. Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 Persp. on Pol. 261, 272 n.10 (2006).
8. The search was in the JLR database and was for “te(Spaeth) and da(aft 12/31/2005).” It was
conducted on June 25, 2007. A subsequent search for “Spaeth and da(aft 12/31/2005)” was run to
double-check for any articles that the first search might have missed. The searches resulted in 117
documents, only eighty-five of which referred to Harold Spaeth’s work.
9. Examples of law review articles relying on data from the Spaeth databases include Brudney &
Ditslear, supra note 2, at 20; Clayton & Pickeril, supra note 2, at 1411; Cross & Lindquist, supra note 2,
at 1685; Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1437, 1483 (2001); Michael Richard Dimino, Counter-Majoritarian
Power and Judges’ Political Speech, 58 Fla. L. Rev. 53, 96 (2006); Epstein et al., The Political (Science)
Context of Judging, supra note 2; Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme
Court’s Criminal Docket, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 67, 67 (2005); Hensley & Johnson, supra note 2; Ruger et
al., supra note 2, at 1153; Christopher E. Smith, The Impact of New Justices: The U.S. Supreme Court
and Criminal Justice Policy, 30 Akron L. Rev. 55, 55 (1996); Michael E. Solimine & Rafeal Gely, The
Supreme Court and the DIG: An Empirical and Institutional Analysis, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1421, 1425
(2005); and Whittington, supra note 2, at 481.
10. Because the other databases are largely derivative of the Supreme Court Database, much of
the critique of the Database applies to the others as well. In addition to the Supreme Court databases,
the website also houses a widely-used Appeals Court Database that has some similar coding protocols.
See Appeals Court Data, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appctdata.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
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The case of Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York
illustrates some of these limitations. In Schenck, a group of abortion
protesters challenged an injunction forbidding them from standing near
clinic entrances and limiting their ability to approach women entering
12
and exiting clinics. The protesters claimed that the injunction violated
their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court upheld portions of
13
the injunction and struck down others.
Most lawyers would describe Schenck as being about the First
Amendment and the limits it places on judicial power. The factual
context of the case involves abortion protesters, but the case’s legal issues
are about freedom of speech and courts’ injunctive powers in light of that
constitutionally-protected freedom. Yet the Supreme Court Database
14
identifies the “issue” in Schenck as “abortion” —because abortion is the
“public policy context” of the case.
Schenck is not unique. Identifying the case’s sole “issue” as abortion
is no random miscoding. To the contrary, it is due to deliberate coding
decisions and protocols. As a result of these decisions and protocols, the
Database has serious, but often unrecognized, implications for empirical
legal scholarship. Put bluntly, rather than illuminate the workings of the
Supreme Court, some empirical findings may reflect the way the
Database reports (or, in the language of empirical analysis, “codes”)
information—or whether it reports certain types of information at all.
Some studies may understate or even fail to find relationships that would
be observable with a more nuanced coding regime; other studies may
overstate or entirely misidentify results. Moreover, because the Database
is deeply embedded in existing empirical research on the Supreme Court,
scholars may unwittingly replicate and magnify its limitations when they
15
rely on earlier work. This Article will identify and discuss examples of

11. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
12. Id. at 366–67, 371.
13. Id. at 379–85.
14. All of the database coding reported in this Article can be found in the Database. See supra
note 4; infra note 28.
15. The Database’s influence is extensive and surprising. For example, a popular website that
archives Supreme Court oral arguments and opinion announcements (as well as the opinions),
organizes the cases “by issue.” See Oyez: U.S. Supreme Court Case Summaries, Oral Arguments, &
Multimedia, www.oyez.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2009). In so doing, it uses Spaeth’s issue coding, but
without explanation. See id. Many scholars—including many non-empirical scholars—might take
advantage of the website, and are likely to find its organization to be anything from mysterious to
misleading.
Ironically, the Database’s ubiquity is sometimes presented as an argument for its continued
uncritical use. See, e.g., Ruger et al., supra note 2, at 1175 (acknowledging that Spaeth’s “issue area
categories may seem awkward or even arbitrary from a legal perspective, as they do not neatly track
traditional doctrinal categories,” but defending their use in part because the “coding protocol is welldefined, and his issue area labels have been widely used by political scientists”).
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16

studies whose findings are unreliable because of the way they use the
Database. One of the important goals of this Article is to ensure that the
creators and consumers of empirical scholarship—lawyers, legal
academics, political scientists, and policymakers alike—understand what
the Database, and studies that rely on it, can and cannot tell us.
Understanding the Database and its limitations is important not only
for undertaking and interpreting specific research projects, but also to
further and enrich empirical legal scholarship in general. The Database’s
limitations are consistent with an influential body of scholarship in
political science that deemphasizes law and legal analysis in favor of
large-scale quantitative analysis with a focus on characterizing case
17
outcomes (who wins and who loses) in terms of ideology. This body of
scholarship, as some critics have noted, too often fails to pay “attention

16. A word about terminology may be helpful here. In statistics, reliability has a very precise
meaning. A statistical measure of something is reliable if it produces the same results repeatedly.
Edward G. Carmines & Richard A. Zeller, Reliability and Validity Assessment 11 (1979). So a
clock that is always precisely 9 minutes slow is reliable. Of course, this clock is inaccurate—it does not
correctly measure what it purports to measure (the time). In the parlance of statistics, the clock’s
measurements of time therefore are not valid. Id. at 12. Although it would certainly be possible to
discuss the Database and its limitations in these and other technical terms, that would, I believe, make
this Article somewhat less accessible to the less-technically minded readers I hope to reach. Therefore,
I use the term “reliable” in its colloquial, descriptive sense, not in its technical, statistical sense. Of
course, the two uses of the terms sometimes overlap.
17. Spaeth is a leader in this field. See generally, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The
Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (1993); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The
Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002) [hereinafter Segal & Spaeth,
Revisited]. There are, of course, political scientists who are critical of this approach. See generally, e.g.,
Cornell W. Clayton, The Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence: New and Old Instititutionalisms,
in Supreme Court Decision-making: New Institutionalist Approaches 15, 15–41 (Cornell W.
Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial
Behavioralists Test the ‘Legal Model’ of Judicial Decision Making, 26 Law & Soc. Inquiry 465 (2001).
Legal academics as well have been critical, particularly of the attitudinal model (described in more
detail in Parts I.A and I.B.2.a.ii), which posits that the case outcomes and Justices’ votes can be
explained by reference to the Justices’ policy preferences and ideology. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth,
The Use and Limits of Martin-Quinn Scores to Assess Supreme Court Justices, with Special Attention to
the Problem of Ideological Drift, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 143, 145–48 (2007); John C.P.
Goldberg, What Nobody Knows, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1461, 1482–84 (2006) (describing the reductionism
of the attitudinal model’s understanding of “attitudes”); Heise, supra note 6, at 836 (noting that
empirical studies may overstate the role of ideology because they do not account for the particularly
hard cases that the Supreme Court decides); Revesz, supra note 3, at 177–78 (criticizing positive
scholars for over-reliance on case outcome and lack of understanding of the practical workings of the
justice system); David Stras, The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1417,
1422–25 (2006) (describing and echoing many critiques of the attitudinal model); id. at 1428–30
(describing and adding to critique of rational choice model); Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross,
What Is Legal Doctrine?, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 517, 522–25 (2006) (criticizing attitudinal model for
ignoring law and legal doctrine); Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 1139, 1189 (2002). Nor have all examinations of political scientists’ quantitative
approaches resulted in criticism by legal scholars. See, e.g., Sisk & Heise, supra note 3, at 788–90
(finding judicial common space scores a useful measure of ideological difference in religious freedom
cases).

482

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:477

to the norms of law, i.e., how law and legal institutions
operate. . . . Positive scholars who work at the nexus of law and politics
need to do a better job of understanding law itself—its methodology, its
18
substance, and its process.” The limitations of the Database are largely
due to just such a failure to take account of law itself. This Article
therefore aims to begin to address this failure.
To further both of these goals—understanding the limitations of the
Database and exploring ways to incorporate law and legal doctrine into
empirical legal scholarship—this Article presents the results of my
Recoding Project. The Recoding Project explores the magnitude and
nature of the Database’s limitations by recoding a random sample of
cases from the last eleven years of the Rehnquist Court, the last
19
Rehnquist “Natural Court.” The findings of the Recoding Project,
combined with my critique of the Database’s coding protocols, will help
scholars be smarter and more accurate in their use of the Database as it
currently exists, better understand when it must be supplemented, and
20
recognize when it is inappropriate to rely on it at all. At the same time,
the Recoding Project provides insight into how scholars might develop
more sophisticated and nuanced resources that do indeed pay “attention
21
to . . . law itself—its methodology, its substance, and its process,”
whether those resources involve building on the Database itself or
creating entirely new resources. The Article is, therefore, an attempt to
advance the cause of empirical scholarship that truly takes account of law
and doctrine.
In Part I of the Article, I describe the Spaeth databases and explain
their significance in political science and empirical legal scholarship.
Specifically, I explore some of the structural aspects and coding protocols
of the Supreme Court Database that fail to adequately account for, and
22
sometimes distort, law and legal doctrine. In Part II, to demonstrate

18. Friedman, supra note 7, at 262. Other political scientists indeed do explore the way that legal
doctrine operates. See generally Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. Richards, Jurisprudential Regimes and
Supreme Court Decisionmaking: The Lemon Regime and Establishment Clause Cases, 37 Law & Soc’y
Rev. 827 (2003); Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential
Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 Law & Soc’y Rev.
135 (2006); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court
Decision Making, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 305 (2002).
19. A Natural Court is one during which there are no personnel changes. Saul Brenner, The New
Certiorari Game, 41 J. Pol. 649, 653 (1979). The last Rehnquist Natural Court lasted from 1994 to
2005. The Justices who served on it were Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
20. This critique is not a condemnation of every use of the Database. To the contrary, the
Database can serve—and has served—many useful purposes, if used properly. See infra notes 28–37
and accompanying text.
21. Friedman, supra note 7, at 262.
22. It should be emphasized that most of the limitations I identify are not latent. To the contrary,
most of them reflect deliberate choices Spaeth made in constructing the Database and about which he
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how these limitations can render unreliable the results of empirical
scholarship, I focus on particular studies that rely on the Database.
In Part III, I address the magnitude of the limitations that I identify
and explore the extent to which a different coding protocol might yield
more nuanced and accurate information and therefore potentially
different results. Specifically, I describe the Recoding Project: my
recoding of a random sample of cases from the last Rehnquist Natural
Court. Among other things, my findings from this Recoding Project
indicate that the Database’s coding masks legal complexity and nuance,
obscuring the ways that different areas of law interact. More specifically,
my findings suggest that the databases systematically underreport law
and doctrine related to courts in particular, and to the structure and
operations of government in general. Such issues include federalism,
procedural matters, immunities, standing, and habeas corpus—issues that
may be very salient to the Justices and lawyers in at least some cases.
Finally, Part IV of the Article explores some insights and
implications for scholarship that relies on the Database, as well as for
future efforts to account for law and legal analysis in quantitative
empirical work. An understanding of the operational limitations of a
resource already familiar to so many scholars, combined with the lessons
of my Recoding Project, provides insights into ways to develop more
accurate and nuanced resources.

I. The Spaeth Databases
A. What Are the Spaeth Databases and How Are They Used?
Supported by a series of National Science Foundation grants, Harold
Spaeth began in the 1980s to create a series of multi-user, publicly23
available databases of Supreme Court decision making. There are
24
currently six related databases. The first and most extensively used is
the Supreme Court Database. This Database incorporates information
25
about every opinion issued from 1953 through the present. The most
recent additions to the collection are the Justice-Centered Databases—
26
one each for the Rehnquist, Burger, and Warren courts. These
databases take the information provided in the Original Database,
is explicit. Nonetheless, some scholars appear to overlook, misunderstand, or insufficiently appreciate
them. “That [the databases] are widely used does not necessarily mean they are widely understood.”
Sara C. Benesh, Becoming an Intelligent User of the Spaeth Supreme Court Databases 1 (unpublished
paper, prepared for the Southwestern Political Science Association, Mar. 2002), available at http://
www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/benesh_handout.pdf.
23. Heise, supra note 6.
24. See The Judicial Research Initiative, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/ (last visited Feb. 14,
2009).
25. Supreme Court Data, supra note 4.
26. Id.
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transform it, and in some cases add to it, so that it is easier to study
voting behavior by Justice instead of by case. The two final databases are
(1) the Vinson-Warren Court Database, which includes “all stages of
decisionmaking (cert, merits, and final vote) for the Vinson and Warren
Courts,” and (2) the Burger Court Database, which includes similar data
27
for the Burger Court. Because the Original Database is the most
prominent and widely used, and because the other databases are
derivative of it, the Original Database is the primary focus of this Article.
The Original Database codes every Supreme Court opinion for a
large number of attributes, reporting a significant amount of information
28
about each case. Much of this coding is relatively straightforward and
uncontroversial. For example, the Database codes the manner in which
the Court takes jurisdiction (such as original, appellate, or certiorari
jurisdiction); whether there was administrative action preceding the
litigation; what reason, if any, the Court gave for granting certiorari;
which lower court(s) previously considered the case; dates of oral
argument and decision; and the Term of the Court in which the case was
29
decided. The Database also indicates which Justices wrote or joined
30
which opinions.
That some of this coding is relatively straightforward does not in any
way diminish the value of having a publicly available database that has
already done this heavy lifting. Spaeth and those who work with him
(including Sara Benesh and Kirk Randazzo) have done an important
service by creating and making available these databases. They have
eliminated the need for much tedious coding, and have thereby
significantly reduced the cost of engaging in empirical analysis of the
Supreme Court. Moreover, by providing a common database upon which
any scholar can rely, they have helped to ensure that different studies
and analyses will compare apples to apples, and that different findings
31
cannot be attributed to different coding protocols.
Relying on Spaeth’s coding, researchers have undertaken all kinds of
projects. Many of these projects are not implicated by the limitations of
the Database discussed in this Article. In a recent work, for example,
27. Benesh, supra note 22.
28. The coding and accompanying decision rules are set out in detail in a publicly-available
codebook. Harold J. Spaeth, The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database 1953–2007
Terms: Documentation (2008) [hereinafter Codebook 2008], available at http://www.cas.sc.edu/
poli/juri/allcourt_codebook.pdf. There are different codebooks for the different databases, all publicly
available. See Supreme Court Data, supra note 4.
29. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 9–16, 28.
30. Id. at 66–73.
31. See Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of Judging, supra note 2, at 790 (explaining
the usefulness of having a standard determination of when each Natural Court begins and ends). Of
course, as previously discussed, this advantage becomes a disadvantage when the Database coding is
problematic. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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Lori Ringhand used the Supreme Court and Justice-Centered Databases
to identify cases in which Justices voted to strike down laws as
32
unconstitutional during the last eleven years of the Rehnquist Court.
Her analysis established that conservative Justices were much more
likely to vote to strike down federal statutes than were more liberal
Justices, raising questions about the popular perception that conservative
33
Justices are less activist than liberal Justices. Other scholars have used
the databases to identify and study, for example, cases in which
34
particular Justices voted together or cases in which the Court was
35
unanimous, or to calculate reversal rates for different circuits as part of
a larger project to develop models of the behavior of intermediate court
36
judges. In addition, once they have downloaded one of Spaeth’s
databases, researchers can and do supplement with their own coding—
identifying, for example, cases in which the Supreme Court defers to
37
different government institutions. Such research has provided, and will
continue to provide, important insights into the workings of the Court.
Spaeth’s own focus in coding and using the databases, particularly
the Original Database, is primarily on the ideology of each case’s
outcome—that is, whether the outcome is “liberal” or “conservative.”
Each case is given either a liberal or conservative code based on the
nature of the prevailing party. So, for example, Spaeth codes cases
involving criminal defendants as liberal if the defendant wins and
conservative if the government wins; cases involving federal taxation, on
the other hand, are coded as liberal if the government wins and
38
conservative if the taxpayer prevails. Spaeth is—quite deliberately—
uninterested in the content of the opinions. As he famously explained, “I

32. Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the
Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 Const. Comment. 43, 46 (2007).
33. Id. at 43–63.
34. Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an Equally Divided Supreme
Court, 7 J. App. Prac. & Process 75, 85 (2005).
35. Hensley & Johnson, supra note 2, at 388.
36. Kevin M. Scott, Understanding Judicial Hierarchy: Reversals and the Behavior of Intermediate
Appellate Judges, 40 Law & Soc’y Rev. 163, 174 (2006).
37. Cross & Nelson, supra note 9, at 1484.
38. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 53–55. The ideological coding in particular areas has
recently been challenged. See Nancy Staudt et al., The Ideological Component of Judging in the
Taxation Context, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1797, 1808 (2006) (noting that Spaeth’s liberal/conservative
coding does not have explanatory power in the context of economic cases, and proposing a different
approach for coding the outcome of tax cases); see also Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick,
Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 43,
79–80 (2006) (noting difficulties in identifying liberal and conservative outcomes in preemption cases);
Matthew J. Sag et al., The Effect of Judicial Ideology in Intellectual Property Cases 8 (July 2, 2007)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
997963 (same with respect to intellectual property cases).
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find the key to judicial behavior in what justices do, [others] in what they
39
say. I focus upon their votes, [others] upon their opinions.”
Spaeth’s emphasis on case outcomes, to the exclusion of law or legal
doctrine, is driven by “theoretical and methodological orientations
40
toward judging” held by many political scientists. They “believe that the
‘law’ boils down to outcomes, and that whatever rationales or
justifications judges invoke are mere smokescreens designed to hide the
41
fact that politics drives the result.” So where the Court votes in favor of
plaintiffs’ standing in, say, an abortion case, Spaeth is likely to treat that
vote as window dressing to get to an outcome about abortion that is
consistent with the Justices’ policy preferences. Spaeth and his
coauthors—most notably Jeffrey Segal—label this description of judging
“the attitudinal model,” and they are among its most vigorous
42
promoters.
Not surprisingly, the attitudinal model, with its liberal/conservative
43
dichotomy, has been extensively criticized. In the attitudinal model’s
starkest form, with its emphasis solely on case outcomes, there is no
difference, for example, between Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion
in the recent school desegregation case and the plurality opinion
44
authored by Chief Justice Roberts. Both Justices sided with the white
plaintiffs in their equal protection challenges to integration plans of the
45
Seattle and Louisville school districts. But the contents of those
39. Harold Spaeth, Jurimetrics and Professor Mendelson: A Troubled Relationship, 27 J. Pol. 875,
879 (1965).
40. Lee Epstein et al., Judging Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and Notes for a
Project on the Internal Revenue Code, 13 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 305, 320 (2003).
41. Id. This focus on outcome to the exclusion of law can reach extremes that, to a lawyer, are
mind-boggling: describing the “apparently unidimensional nature of Supreme Court decisionmaking,”
two political scientists (including Spaeth’s frequent coauthor Jeffrey Segal) assert in a 2005 article:
“The vote on the merits in any given case is as straightforward as a majority rule process gets. Justices
essentially make a binary, reverse or affirm decision.” Segal & Westerland, supra note 2, at 1351, 1324.
42. See, e.g., Segal & Spaeth, Revisited, supra note 17, at 86. The attitudinal model and its
related theory, the strategic model, see Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make
(1998), are not the only ways to think about the role of politics or political preferences in Supreme
Court decision making. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 9 at 74–88, 93 (discussing the relationship
between judicial preferences or “priors” and case facts, outcomes and reasoning); McNollgast, Politics
and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1631,
1635 (1995) (arguing that electoral stability leads to doctrinal stability and that electoral and political
changes are likely to lead to doctrinal changes).
43. See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 2, at 1688 (“The data on case outcomes may simply be too
unrefined to identify an ideological effect. They show nothing about the content of the opinions . . . .”);
Frank B. Cross et al., Warren Court Precedents in the Rehnquist Court, 24 Const. Comment. 3, 4 (2007)
(“[T]he binary outcome coding cannot measure whether a particular opinion is moderately liberal (or
conservative) or more extremely ideological.” (citations omitted)); Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes
About Attitudes, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1733, 1733–34 (2003) (reviewing objections to the attitudinal model
and Spaeth and Segal’s responses).
44. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
45. Id. at 2768; id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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opinions are significantly different. Justice Kennedy, who cast the
deciding vote, explicitly rejected the plurality’s “all-too-unyielding
insistence that race cannot [ever] be a factor” in school district
46
decisions. Despite their agreement on “outcome”—in the narrow sense
of agreeing that the Supreme Court would reverse the lower court
decisions, giving a victory to the plaintiffs—the opinions are not
uniformly “conservative.” And the differences between Kennedy and
Roberts are likely to be central to the real-world impact of the case. “The
language of the opinion [that] at least purports to establish the rules to
47
govern future cases,” provides important information for which the
attitudinal model—or any model that focuses primarily on outcome—
fails to account.
There can, of course, be no question that policy preferences or
ideology play a role in Supreme Court decision making. But the
interesting and important contemporary questions—and the ones that
cannot be answered using the Database—are whether and how much law
48
matters as well, how ideology and law interact with or affect each other,
and how these interactions vary from case to case or from Justice to
49
Justice. The attitudinal model and the Database’s coding also fail to
take into account that a single Justice’s policy preferences may conflict in
50
particular cases. As the authors of a recent article about preemption law
explain, for example, in some cases, a Justice cannot cast a purely
conservative or purely liberal vote:
Statutory preemption cases are often viewed as a species of
“federalism.” From that vantage, preemption cases present a
conundrum, nicely captured by the United States Supreme Court Data
Base [sic]. That widely used data set includes preemption cases under
the general issue area of “federalism.” Within that issue area, it codes a
“pro-federal” or “anti-state” outcome or vote as “liberal.” But
whatever plausibility that coding may have in the context of
straightforward federalism cases, it makes no sense in preemption
cases, where a “liberal” vote for the federal government (and against
the states) is also a vote for “big business” (and against pro-regulatory

46. Id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
47. Tiller & Cross, supra note 17, at 523; see also Cass Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political?
An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary 65 (2006) (“For the actual development of the law,
the opinion matters a great deal.”); Revesz, supra note 3, at 177 n.39.
48. See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 257, 260 (2005).
49. Building resources and conducting scholarship that take account of law and doctrine does not
necessarily mean, of course, that scholars will find that the Justices’ votes and opinions can be
explained or predicted in whole or in part on the basis of “law,” and I make no such claim here. More
legally nuanced coding and analysis might weaken the claims of those who believe that the Justices are
in fact motivated largely by ideology. But it also might strengthen those claims by showing that the
Justices treat similar legal issues differently in different “public policy contexts.”
50. Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Do We Measure It?,
29 Wash. U. J.L. Pol’y (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 19), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121228).
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constituencies that want states to regulate above the federal
baseline)—an attitude that the Judicial Database in many other
contexts codes as “conservative.” In preemption cases, conservative
attitudes (pro-state, pro-business) conflict, as do the corresponding
51
liberal attitudes.

As this example illustrates, the attitudinal model, and the Database on
which it relies, oversimplify the Court’s jurisprudence in ways that are
particularly problematic for scholars interested in law and legal doctrine.
B. The Problem of Law
Although my critiques of the Database have some implications for
52
the attitudinal model, the attitudinal model is not the main focus of this
Article. My primary concern is different and more specific: what happens
when scholars who, unlike Spaeth, want to take account of legal doctrine,
use the Database? With interest in empirical legal scholarship at an all
time high in the legal academy and given the prominence of the
Database in political science, scholars may presume that the Database is
the gold standard for empirical scholarship of the Supreme Court.
53
Indeed, it is sometimes touted as such.
Moreover, at first glance, many legal scholars may presume that the
Database provides a fair amount of substantive information about law.
There are codes for what Spaeth calls “issue,” “issue area,” and “legal
54
provision.” Yet, as I will show, these codes cannot be relied on for
complete or accurate information about how law and legal doctrine
operate or even appear in Supreme Court cases.
1. Definitions of “Issue,” “Issue Area,” and “Legal Provision”
a. Issue
Lawyers may assume that by “issue,” the Database means legal
issue. But the issue variable is designed instead to describe “the subject
matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. . . . The objective is to
categorize the case from a public policy standpoint, a perspective that the
55
legal basis for decision . . . commonly disregards.” The issue in a case, as
identified by the Database, therefore has to do with its social or political
context as much—or more—than its legal or doctrinal content. This
distinction between legal issue and public policy context explains why the
Database identifies the issue in Schenck, the First Amendment case
51. Greve & Klick, supra note 38, at 79 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also Epstein et
al., supra note 40, at 305–07; Tiller & Cross, supra note 17, at 523; Young, supra note 17.
52. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of Judging, supra note 2, at 808
(praising the “richness” of the Database’s coding and encouraging legal scholars to rely on it); see also
supra text accompanying notes 6–8.
54. I do not discuss here certain other codes, such as authority for decision or type of party, that
also may be problematic. This Article’s discussion is thus more illustrative than comprehensive.
55. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 42 (emphasis added).
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involving abortion protesters, as “abortion,” not as the First
56
Amendment.
Every case in the Database is coded for at least one “issue,” and
most cases in fact have only one issue coded, which, as I show below, is
due to explicit coding protocols. The Database’s codebook (the
57
Codebook) identifies more than 260 individual issue codes. They range
from, for example, abortion, to “confrontation (right to confront accuser,
call and cross-examine witnesses),” to union arbitration, to “federal or
58
state consumer protection.”
b. Issue Area
Each of the more than 260 issue codes is categorized into one, and
only one, of thirteen issue areas: (1) criminal procedure, (2) civil rights,
(3) First Amendment, (4) due process, (5) privacy, (6) attorneys, (7)
unions, (8) economic activity, (9) judicial power, (10) federalism, (11)
59
interstate relations, (12) federal taxation, and (13) miscellaneous. The
number and precision of issues assigned to each issue area varies widely.
The issue area “miscellaneous” has two issues; “interstate relations” has
60
three. At the other extreme, “criminal procedure” has sixty individual
61
issues, “judicial power” has fifty-one, and “civil rights” has forty-two.
c. Legal Provision
In addition to coding each case for issue and issue area, the
Database also identifies each case’s “legal provisions.” Spaeth defines
legal provision as the constitutional provisions, statutes, or court rules
62
considered in the case.
The difference between “legal provision” and “issue” invites some
additional explanation. Lawyers, who are accustomed to thinking about
legal issues, may find the Database’s distinction between the two
variables to be counterintuitive. In any given case within the Database,
the coded “legal provision” and “issue” might be related, and in some
cases they overlap. The codes, however, purport to identify different

56. All of the cases discussed in this Part were in the random sample of ninety-five cases drawn
for the Recoding Project, described in Part III. The cases discussed are Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S.
320 (2005); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681
(1997); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); and Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
57. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 42–52.
58. Abortion is issue 533. Id. at 48. Confrontation is issue 110. Id. at 45. Union arbitration is issue
553. Id. at 48. Consumer protection is issue 656. Id. at 49.
59. Id. at 42–52.
60. Id. at 52.
61. Id. at 44–47, 50–51.
62. Id. at 31.
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types of information. In Schenck, for example, while the “issue” (public
63
policy context) is abortion, the legal provision is the First Amendment.

Table A: Definitions of Key Variables in the Database
Variable

Definition

Issue

Designed to identify the public policy context of each case

Issue Area

Categorizes issues into one of thirteen issue areas, such as civil rights,
criminal procedure, and economic activity

Legal Provision

Designed to identify the statutes, constitutional provisions, and court
rules considered in each case

2. The Limitations of the Database
Each of three variables described in the last subsection has
important limitations. For the most part, these limitations are not latent.
To the contrary, they are largely based on decisions Spaeth made
deliberately, and about which he is explicit. Nonetheless, the limitations
themselves, and their implications for empirical research, are not well
understood.
a. Issue and Issue Area
There are four primary—and largely unrecognized—limitations to
the issue and issue area coding: (1) as already explained, by “issue” the
Database does not refer to legal issue as lawyers and law professors
understand it; (2) the Database operates with a rebuttable presumption
of only one issue per case, and the exceptions are rare; (3) the list of issue
codes itself omits entire areas of law and doctrine; and (4) the
relationship between issue and issue area is sometimes nonsensical. Each
of these limitations has implications for researchers who rely on the
Database, as well as for those who wish to interpret or rely on the
findings of work that uses the Database.
i. Public Policy Context, Not Law
Although Spaeth is explicit that he defines issue to mean “public
64
policy standpoint” and not legal issue, this aspect of the coding is easily
and often misunderstood. Too often, scholars either appear to assume
that by “issue” Spaeth means “legal issue,” or they fail to make a clear
distinction between Spaeth’s definition of issue and what the word
“issue” means to most lawyers and legal academics. Statements like the
following, all made by scholars relying on the Database, are not
uncommon:

63. See Supreme Court Data, supra note 4.
64. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 42.
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• The judicial power issue area “includes cases adjudicating issues
65
of standing, justiciability, jurisdiction, and the like.”
• “[O]nly 3.79 percent [of argued cases] contained more than one
issue (e.g. a case that raised questions about federal taxation and
66
federalism).”
• “Using Spaeth[’s Database], we counted the number of legal
67
issues raised in the case . . . .”
• “Although [the] Judicial Database coded these two cases’ legal
68
issues differently . . . .”
• “For the time period of interest, the Spaeth database identifies
506 disputes in which . . . First Amendment guarantees . . . were
69
at stake . . . .”
Such language certainly sounds like the Database codes legal issues, and
any lawyer or legal academic reviewing the literature that relies on the
Database would likely so presume.
In addition, despite Spaeth’s own assertion that “issue” means public
70
policy context, his list of issues—in some areas—is very detailed and
some of his issue codes appear, at least to a lawyer, to be referring to
legal issues. For example, “[i]n the area of criminal procedure alone
there are . . . [numerous] distinct issues, including ‘speedy trial,’ ‘right to
71
counsel,’ and ‘cruel and unusual punishment.’” The judicial power issue
area likewise includes codes for the Rules of Civil Procedure and for
72
standing. A lawyer or legal scholar perusing the issue codes might easily
presume that they in fact are designed to identify the legal issues in a
case.
ii. One Issue per Case
Compounding this problem is the fact that the Database identifies
73
only one issue per case, with a very small number of exceptions. By my
calculations, only about 8.6% of orally argued cases in the Database are
65. Dimino, supra note 9, at 97 (emphasis added).
66. Martin et al., supra note 2 (emphasis added).
67. Timothy R. Johnson et al., Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 Law &
Soc’y Rev. 349, 363 (2005) (emphasis added).
68. Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Justices’ Decision Making, 29 J.
Legal Stud. 721, 734 (2000) (emphasis added).
69. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Trumping the First Amendment?, 21 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y
81, 93 (2006) (emphasis added).
70. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 42.
71. Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of Judging, supra note 2, at 808. The authors
actually significantly overstate the number of codes in the criminal procedure area, saying that there
are “well over hundreds of distinct issues.” Id. In fact, the criminal procedure area contains sixty
distinct issues. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 44–45.
72. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 50.
73. Id. at 42 (“Of the many thousand records in the database, few have a legal basis for decision
that applies to a second issue.”).
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74

assigned more than one issue. Although the coding protocol does not
require only one issue per case, the Database’s largely unidimensional
coding arises from a deliberate decision. Explaining why requires a slight
detour into the structure of the Database.
75
Each case in the Database is coded for the legal provisions at issue.
(Legal provisions are discussed in more detail in section B of this Part.)
So Schenck, for example, receives a legal provision code of “First
Amendment.” The Database operates with a rebuttable presumption
76
that each legal provision will be assigned only one issue code. The
Codebook explains that “[a] second issue should apply only when a
77
preference for one rather than the other cannot readily be made.” This
point, although explicit in the Codebook, is not well-understood, so I will
reiterate: Spaeth deliberately codes only one issue per legal provision.
And this turns out to mean—almost always—only one issue per case.
(For the sake of simplicity, in this Article, I refer to a presumption in
favor of only one issue per case.) So, returning again to Schenck, once
the case was assigned the abortion code, no further issue codes were
added.
This deliberately unidimensional coding can be deeply problematic
for scholars who use the Database. Coding only one issue per case
necessarily obfuscates the relationships between laws, doctrines, and
public policy contexts—relationships that may in fact be crucially
important to the way the Justices vote or write. Even scholars interested
in the interaction between different “public policy contexts” may be
unable to explore such questions because Spaeth provides no substantive
78
guidance about how he decides which issue to identify. He offers no
criteria to explain why he codes Schenck as an abortion case rather than
as a First Amendment case, or only as an abortion case rather than as
both. Spaeth’s issue coding therefore rests on unarticulated criteria and
hidden decisions—decisions that, as I discuss in more detail below, may
affect work done by those who rely on the Database.

74. To calculate this percentage, I first identified the total number of orally argued cases decided
between October 1953 and December 2006 by relying on case citations (analu = 0) and decision types
(1, 6, and 7), for a total of 6138 cases. I identified the total number of orally argued multi-issue cases
(528) by identifying cases assigned more than one issue (analu = 2 and 5), keeping the relevant
decision types (1, 6, and 7) constant, and deleting duplicate case citations.
75. Id. at 31.
76. Id. at 42 (“[E]ach legal provision should not generally have more than a single issue applied to
it.”).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 42 (“Although criteria for the identification of issues are hard to articulate, the focus
here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.”); id. (“I have attempted to
identify issues on the basis of the Court’s own statements as to what the case is about.”); id. (“The
objective is to categorize the case from a public policy standpoint, a perspective that the legal basis for
decision . . . commonly disregards.”).
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Both of these first two limitations—the focus on public policy
context and the presumption of one issue per case—are related to
Spaeth’s attitudinal model. In his model, each case must be coded as
79
either liberal or conservative, but cannot be both. The “public policy
context” can help to position a particular case against the political issues
of the day in ways that often makes it easier to decide whether to code
the case outcome as liberal or conservative. Likewise, by coding only one
issue, Spaeth avoids the problem of having issues that may point in
80
different directions. So, in Schenck, with its lone issue code of
“abortion,” the Justices’ votes against the First Amendment rights of
abortion protesters can be easily coded as liberal while the votes in favor
of the protesters’ rights were labeled conservative. Replace “abortion
protesters” with “civil rights marchers” and the liberal/conservative
aspect of the case takes on a very different political cast—even if the First
81
Amendment issues are identical.
iii. Underinclusive Issue Codes
While the presumption in favor of one issue per case can lead to
oversimplified and underinclusive identification of issues, the available
codes themselves are also underinclusive. For example, there are no
codes for such important and recurrent legal issues as immunities,
separation of powers, sexual harassment, or many aspects of
82
administrative or employment law. In particular, outside of the criminal
procedure issue area, the Database’s codebook evidences a dearth of
issues that relate to judge-made or judge-elaborated law and doctrine.

79. See id. at 53–54 (noting that although some exceptions exist, “each issue in each case will
either indicate a liberal or conservative outcome”); see also id. at 53 (listing the exceptions, and noting
that for a very small number of specific issues in the Interstate Relations and Miscellaneous issue,
“[a]n ‘8’ has been entered in the DIR variable of these cases either because the issue does not lend
itself to a pro or con description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states), or because no
convention exists as to which is the pro side and which is the con side”).
80. Artificial unidimensionality is not the only way to solve this problem. In fact, in those few
cases that have more than one issue, Spaeth reportedly codes the political direction of the outcome
with reference to the first issue coded—presumably the issue he concludes is dominant. Epstein &
Segal, supra note 69, at 94 n.52.
81. Had Spaeth coded the case as involving a First Amendment issue, he might well have
identified the votes in the opposite ideological direction, because vindications of First Amendment
rights are generally coded as liberal. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 58. That Spaeth’s identification
of issue is crucially related to his determination of the ideology of a case raises questions about the
circularity of his coding and of the attitudinal model itself. See Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The
Most Dangerous Justice Rides into the Sunset, 24 Const. Comment. 199, 207 (2007) (“[T]he choice to
code Rosenberger as an establishment controversy,” as opposed to a free speech controversy, “almost
certainly led to the coding of this decision as conservative.” (citing Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors
of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995))); Young, supra note 17, at 1190 (“[M]any cases can be
classified as either ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative,’ depending on the salience of different factors to the
classifier. Was United States v. Lopez a ‘liberal’ decision, because it was ‘pro-person accused or
convicted of crime,’ or was it ‘conservative,’ because it was anti-federal power?” (footnote omitted)).
82. See Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 44–52.
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The lack of codes for sexual harassment, immunities, and the dormant
83
commerce clause are examples of this tendency. Spaeth himself might
argue that because he makes no claims to be coding legal issues, he
cannot be faulted for failing to identify them. But this aspect of the
Database renders it at best difficult, and at worst misleading, for scholars
who wish to study a host of important legal issues.
The issue codes listed in the Codebook also have a somewhat dated
feel. To some degree, the Codebook reads as a catalog of issues that
were particularly salient during the Warren and Burger Courts and,
perhaps, during the first ten years of the Rehnquist Court. Since then,
however, other legal issues have moved to the forefront, both politically
and in terms of the Court’s jurisprudence and doctrine. There are codes
for different aspects of search and seizure law, for example, including a
specific code for the search and seizure of vehicles, but only a single
84
catch-all category for securities.
iv. Misassigned Issue Areas
In some cases, the issue code itself may be appropriate, but it locates
the case in an issue area that is, upon examination, nonsensical.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., for example, addresses whether
85
construing patent claims is a jury question or a question for the court.
The Supreme Court held that although patent infringement cases
generally are subject to the Seventh Amendment jury right, the claim
86
construction aspect of such cases is not. The Database identifies the
issue in this civil case as “190[:] jury trial (right to . . .)”—which is found
87
in the criminal procedure issue area. But Markman has nothing to do
88
with criminal law.

83. There are no codes that can plausibly be understood to relate to immunities. There is one
code for sex discrimination in employment (284). Id. at 44. There is another code (222) defined as:
“employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, national origin, or working conditions. Not
alienage, which is 272, or gender, which is 284.” Id. This definition could conceivably include sexual
harassment as being “on the basis of” working conditions, but working conditions and harassment are
not bases of discrimination. They are a manifestation of discriminatory intent, actionable only if
motivated by impermissible discrimination. See Oncale v. Sundowner, 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (“We
have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is
automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or
connotations.”).
84. Compare Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 44 (search and seizure codes), with id. at 49
(securities code).
85. 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
86. Id. at 384–91.
87. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 45.
88. In fact, criminal and civil jury rights involve entirely different constitutional amendments and
legal doctrines. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; U.S. Const. amend. VII. Spaeth himself acknowledges
that there are some such discrepancies. So, for example, Spaeth says that codes 111 through 119, which
appear within the criminal procedure issue area and deal with “subconstitutional fair
procedure . . . need not necessarily pertain to a criminal action.” Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 45.
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In part, this problem arises from the underinclusive issue codes
described above. But it also arises from a peculiarity of the coding
protocols: Spaeth codes the issue first; the issue area is then
89
automatically computer-generated. So rather than assign Markman an
issue area of judicial power or economic activity and then seek a juryright issue code within those areas, Spaeth apparently assigns the juryright code first—which then locates the case in the criminal procedure
issue area.
Because researchers often rely on issue area coding to identify or
90
analyze cases, such discrepancies have the potential to skew research
results. For example, a researcher looking at criminal cases, as identified
in the Database, likely would unwittingly include Markman in her
sample. And a researcher relying on the Database to identify all patent
91
or intellectual property cases would not find Markman.
Such discrepancies appear even in such high-profile cases as Clinton
v. Jones, Paula Jones’ lawsuit against Bill Clinton, in which Jones accused
Clinton of sexually harassing her when he was Governor of Arkansas,
92
and she was a state employee. The Court addressed whether the case
against Clinton could proceed while he was a sitting President, or
whether it should be stayed until he was done serving, providing him
with a form of temporary immunity in part due to separation of powers
93
concerns. But the Codebook provides no issue codes for immunities,
separation of powers, or sexual harassment. Instead, Clinton v. Jones has
an issue code of “616: liability, governmental; tort or contract actions by
or against government or government officials other than actions
brought under a civil rights action,” which is found in the issue area of
94
“economic activity.” Leaving aside the fact that this case was not about
89. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 82.
90. See, e.g., Dimino, supra note 9, at 86 n.163 (relying on Spaeth’s coding of First Amendment
cases to discern the Justices’ track records in upholding First Amendment challenges); id. at 96–98 &
n.214 (same for “judicial power” cases); Smith, supra note 9, at 58–64 (relying on “criminal procedure”
cases).
91. This problem may not matter for every research project. It is less likely to affect an analysis
that, for example, lumps together a number of issue areas—civil rights, criminal procedure, due
process, privacy, and First Amendment, for example, to study the Court’s treatment of “civil liberties”
cases in general. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only
Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 3–10 (2005). Efforts to study more specific areas of the law or
interactions between particular areas of law are much more likely to be unreliable if they use the
Database uncritically.
92. 520 U.S. 681, 684 (1997).
93. Id.
94. There is a decent argument that this case is miscoded even on Spaeth’s own terms. Arguably,
the case should have been coded as “391: liability, civil rights acts . . . tort actions involving liability
that are based on a civil rights act,” within the Civil Rights issue area. Codebook 2008, supra note 28,
at 49. Paula Jones sued Bill Clinton and a former Arkansas state police officer, Danny Ferguson.
Clinton, 520 U.S. at 684. She brought two counts against Clinton alone: one under § 1983 for depriving
her of her constitutional rights, and one state common law count for intentional infliction of emotional
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the liability of a government official, but rather was about the timing of a
suit over actions taken before Clinton became President, defining the
case as being one about economic activity unquestionably describes its
95
least salient aspects.
b. Legal Provision
The “legal provision” variable focuses on textually-based legal
provisions—“the constitutional provision(s), statute(s), or court rule(s)
96
that the Court considered in the case.” At first blush, this definition
seems unremarkable. A First Amendment challenge to a statute, for
example, should have two legal provisions coded: the First Amendment
and the statute itself. Spaeth’s criteria for and practice of coding legal
provisions, however, result in significant underreporting of law and legal
doctrine. There are three primary reasons for this underinclusiveness: (1)
how Spaeth defines legal provisions, (2) where he looks for them, and (3)
how the criteria are actually applied.
i. Text-Based Doctrines Only
The Database’s definition of “legal provision” omits many
significant legal doctrines that are not textually based, but are instead
97
judge-made or elaborated doctrines. Such doctrines are known by
reference to particular case names. In administrative law, for example,
98
99
Chevron and Skidmore are synonymous with a complex, evolving, and
controversial set of doctrines relating to the level of deference courts
owe to administrative interpretations of law. Identifying a case as
involving Chevron is a quick way to convey an enormous amount of
information about the content and legal context of the case. But the

distress. Id. at 684–86. She brought two counts against both defendants—one under § 1985 for
conspiracy to deprive her of her constitutional rights and one state law cause of action for defamation.
Id. So the case involved both civil rights and non–civil rights torts claims, and the case was widely
characterized as a sexual harassment case. But the bottom line is that Paula Jones’ specific causes of
actions are among the least important aspects of the case.
95. Clinton also raises questions about Spaeth’s liberal/conservative designations. He codes the
outcome in Clinton as liberal, presumably because it is a decision in favor of a sexual harassment
plaintiff against a powerful defendant, a civil rights plaintiff against a government official. Codebook
2008, supra note 28, at 53. But in the political atmosphere of its day, Clinton certainly was understood
to advance the cause of conservative interests. In contrast, Spaeth codes Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000), as a conservative decision. Most people would undoubtedly agree, but here Spaeth appears to
be using the opposite criteria from Clinton. After all, the victor in Bush v. Gore was the plaintiff, who
was advancing a broad and novel theory of equal protection—generally a liberal view. Id. at 111.
96. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 31.
97. There are a few exceptions. “5AMI” is the legal provision code for Miranda warnings. Id. at
35. In addition, the Codebook identifies the following doctrines as legal provisions: abstention,
retroactivity of a constitutional right, exclusionary rule, harmless error, res judicata, estoppel, and writ
improvidently granted. Id. at 38.
98. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
99. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 124 (1944).
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100

Database does not do so.
Other elaborate and well-established
doctrines—such as qualified immunity and sexual harassment—cannot
be identified in the Database because they do not involve application of
a “legal provision” as narrowly defined by the Codebook. In fact, there
are a fair number of cases coded without any legal provision at all—
apparently because they do not involve a statute, rule, or constitutional
101
provision. Spaeth’s narrow definition of legal provision—especially
when coupled with his underinclusive issue codes—oversimplifies the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and obscures valuable information about
102
numerous areas of law and legal doctrines.
ii. The Shortcomings of Not Relying on the Opinions
Themselves
The second major limitation to Spaeth’s coding of legal provisions
has to with how and where he looks for them. Until recently, Spaeth
explained that “[t]he basic criterion to determine the legal provision(s)
that a case concerns is a reference to it in at least one of the num- bered
103
[sic] holdings in the . . . ‘Syllabus By Reporter Of Decisions.’” Spaeth
acknowledges that this criterion may miss some legal provisions,
but he argues that it is “a reasonably objective and reliable
indicator. . . . Although one may argue that my criterion is excessively

100. There is an issue code—in the judicial power issue area—for “judicial review of
administrative agency’s or administrative officer’s actions and procedures” (721). Codebook 2008,
supra note 28, at 50. This code is overinclusive, covering all kinds of judicial review of all kinds of
administrative actions. Moreover, because of the presumption in favor of only one issue per case, this
code may not be attached to many cases that in fact involve such review.
101. The Codebook explicitly acknowledges the possibility that some cases will not have a coded
legal provision. Id. at 32.
102. These limitations do not necessarily lead to problems with every study. A scholar interested in
Chevron, for example, could certainly generate her own list of cases in which the Court relied on or
addressed that case or the doctrine that bears its name. But not all studies lend themselves to such
independent data collection, and not all researchers understand when and why they should try to
undertake it.
103. Harold J. Spaeth, The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database 1953–2003
Terms: Documentation 33 (2005) [hereinafter Codebook 2005] (on file with The Hastings Law
Journal). In September 2008, Spaeth revised his Codebook. The current Codebook has a slightly
different explanation. According to the September 2008 Codebook, “[t]he basic criterion to determine
the legal provision(s) [within a case] is the ‘summary’ in the Lawyers’ Edition [a commercial reporting
service provided by LexisNexis]. Supplementary is a reference to it in at least one of the numbered
holdings in the . . . ‘Syllabus By Reporter Of Decisions.’” Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 31. This
change is unexplained in the Codebook, but Professor Spaeth tells me that he made the change after
he read an earlier draft of this Article and realized that the Codebook inaccurately described his
protocol for this variable. E-mail from Harold J. Spaeth, Research Professor of Law, Michigan State
University College of Law, to author (Feb. 9, 2009, 07:52:00 CST) (on file with author). In this Article,
my analysis of Spaeth’s coding protocols for legal provision primarily addresses his reliance on the
syllabus, but all of my criticisms apply with equal, if not greater, force to reliance on a commercial
reporter’s summary.
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formalistic; that it is too gross; or conversely, too refined; no other
104
feasible criterion matches it for objectivity and reliability.”
Spaeth takes this approach even though the syllabus of an opinion is
105
not authoritative in any way. It cannot be cited as authority by lawyers
106
or courts. The syllabi are not written by the Justices, nor are they
107
written by their law clerks. While the Justice who drafts a majority
opinion reviews the syllabus (or has his or her law clerk review it) for
accuracy, unlike the opinion itself, it does not circulate among all the
108
Justices before publication.
What the syllabus does is provide a short summary of the opinion for
a reader looking for information about the case, and it can provide a
road map to the opinion for readers interested in particular sections or
subjects. In fact, it is often one very useful place to look to identify legal
provisions as well as other aspects of a case. It should not, however, be
the only place. And the limitations of relying on the syllabus are
exacerbated still further by the fact that Spaeth generally chooses to
report only legal provisions found in the numbered holdings of the
syllabus—meaning that a particular legal provision cited explicitly only in
the general description of the case that precedes the holdings may well
109
go unreported in the Database, even if it is central to the case.
110
Almendarez-Torres v. United States provides an example of how a
syllabus may not refer to particular legal provisions that are in fact
considered by the Court, leading to underreporting of legal provisions in
the Database. In Almendarez-Torres, the petitioner was a noncitizen
convicted of the crime of reentering the United States following
111
deportation. He argued that a factor—recidivism—relied on by the
court to enhance his sentence was actually an element of the crime that

104. Codebook 2005, supra note 103, at 33; Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 31.
105. Of course, the Lawyers’ Edition summaries also have no authority whatsoever. Moreover,
they do not appear in the slip opinions or official reporters, and, unlike the syllabi, are not even
drafted by Court personnel.
106. The Supreme Court itself makes all these limitations explicit in a note that appears before
every syllabus: “The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by
the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.” See, e.g., Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 129
S. Ct. 846, 847 (2009) (citing United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906)
(“In the first place, the headnote is not the work of the court, nor does it state its decision—though a
different rule, it is true, is prescribed by statute in some States. It is simply the work of the reporter,
gives his understanding of the decision, and is prepared for the convenience of the profession in the
examination of the reports.”)).
107. The syllabi are written by the Reporter of Decisions, an office of career appointees who assist
the Court in its work. Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice 30 (8th ed. 2002).
108. Id.
109. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 31. But see id. (“Where this summary lacks numbered
holdings, it is treated as though it has but one number.”).
110. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
111. Id. at 227.
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should have been alleged in the indictment and proven beyond a
112
reasonable doubt. To resolve this question, the Court had to construe
the statute under which he was convicted and sentenced, 8 U.S.C.
113
§ 1326. The statute, referenced in the syllabus, is appropriately coded
as a legal provision in the case.
But the Court also addressed a constitutional challenge raised by the
114
defendant. Almendarez-Torres claimed that treating recidivism as a
sentencing factor but not as an element of the crime violated the Due
115
Process Clause. The Court explicitly addressed and rejected this
116
claim. The syllabus, however, does not mention the Due Process
117
Clause, the Fifth Amendment, or the Fourteenth Amendment. It
118
simply refers generically to constitutional requirements. As a result,
pursuant to Spaeth’s coding protocol, the Database identifies no legal
provision other than the statute itself. This case, therefore, would not be
identified by, for example, a researcher using the Database to locate due
119
process challenges to criminal statutes.
c. Problems in Application
In fact, the Database does not consistently report even those legal
120
provisions that are referenced in the syllabus, a problem I discuss in
more detail in Part III. Spaeth provides no explanation for these
omissions, and there are no relevant exceptions to the coding protocols.
Spaeth claims that his method of coding legal provisions avoids the
“scourge of analysts in this regard”—researchers’ inability “to agree on
121
just what legal provisions the Court addressed in a given case.” But
making such determinations is unavoidable, even when looking only to
the syllabus. Just as the Almendarez-Torres syllabus omitted explicit
reference to relevant legal provisions, many syllabi include references to
legal provisions that are unimportant to the holding. Including all such
legal provisions in the coding would render the Database overinclusive
112. Id. at 228–39.
113. Id. at 229–35.
114. Id. at 239.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 239–47.
117. Id. at 224–25.
118. Id. at 225. Oddly (in light of the September 2008 revisions to the Codebook), although the
Lawyers’ Edition summary explicitly mentions the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 140 L.E.2d 350, 350 (1998), Spaeth does not code it as a legal
provision. See infra Parts I.B.2.b.iii and III.A.2.c. for more discussion of the Database’s failure to code
legal provisions even when they fall within its protocols.
119. The case would also not be picked up through its issue coding. Oddly, the issue coded is
double jeopardy. Although double jeopardy is mentioned in the opinion, it is not in fact at issue. Id. at
247.
120. The Database does not consistently report legal provisions referenced in the Lawyers’ Edition
summary either.
121. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 31.
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and unwieldy. So Spaeth must, unavoidably, make the very
determination he claims to avoid.
122
The case of Rousey v. Jacoway provides a good example of why it
is necessary to actually read the opinions to make the determination
about what legal provisions are really at issue. The issue in Rousey was:
“Whether and to what extent Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
are exempt from a bankruptcy estate under” a provision of the
123
Bankruptcy Code. Not surprisingly, the syllabus cites the Bankruptcy
124
Code, which is the only legal provision Spaeth codes. But the syllabus
also mentions 26 U.S.C. § 408(a), the provision of the Internal Revenue
Code that governs IRAs—and that statute goes uncoded in the
Database, presumably because the citation appears in the syllabus to be
125
in passing. In the syllabus, the cite to the Internal Revenue Code
appears only once, and the discussion of IRAs in the syllabus focuses on
126
what could be described as facts about how IRAs work. On the other
hand, the opinion itself makes clear that what is important about IRAs
are the statutorily-created parameters of these retirement accounts, and
127
how those parameters interact with bankruptcy law. Reliance only on
the syllabus obscures the significance of the Internal Revenue Code to
the case. In general, reliance on the syllabus alone prevents the coder
from accurately evaluating judgments about “just what legal provisions
128
the Court addressed in a given case.” Only by reading the opinions
themselves can a coder make an accurate determination about what legal
provisions were actually considered by the Court.
C. In Summary
Not all what I have said so far is new. In different forms, some of my
points form the basis of some of the most trenchant criticisms of Spaeth’s
attitudinal model, and much of the critique of the failure of positive
129
scholars to take account of legal doctrine. My critique differs, however,
in its focus on the dangers of relying on the Database (or on research
that itself relies on the Database) for scholars who purport or aspire to
take account of legal doctrine.
I do not intend my efforts to be purely critical. To the contrary, one
of the goals of this Article is to help scholars become more careful users
122. 544 U.S. 320 (2005).
123. Brief for Petitioners at i, Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320 (2005) (No. 03-1407), 2004 WL
1900505.
124. 544 U.S. at 320.
125. Id. at 320–21. The Internal Revenue Code is likewise mentioned but not described or
analyzed in the Lawyers’ Edition summary. Rousey v. Jacoway, 161 L.Ed.2d 563, 563–64 (2005).
126. Rousey, 544 U.S. at 320–22.
127. Id. at 327–29, 328 n.3.
128. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 31.
129. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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of the Database and more critical consumers of research based upon it.
Notably, scholars simply cannot assume that a collection of cases with
certain issue or issue area codes captures all relevant cases, that the
number of issues coded per case is accurate, or that all cases with a
certain issue code in fact involve the same legal issues; nor can scholars
assume that all relevant legal provisions, issues, or doctrines are
identified.

II. Limitations and Challenges for Empirical
Legal Scholarship
The limitations of the Database’s coding have significant
implications for some empirical legal scholarship that relies on the
130
Database. To explore those implications, I focus in particular on two
problems that researchers encounter, often unknowingly: (1) the
impossibility of knowing how many (and which) legal issues arise in a
particular case and (2) the difficulty of using the Database to study the
way different areas of law interact with or affect each other. Both of
these problems arise primarily from Spaeth’s deliberate practice of
coding only one issue per case and from his decision not to code legal
issues at all, but they implicate other aspects of the coding protocols as
well. As I will show, researchers do not always appreciate these
problems, and this failure raises questions about the reliability of their
findings. As legal scholars increasingly embrace empirical scholarship,
more and more studies that attempt to use the Database to study
substantive questions about law are likely to appear in the literature.
Understanding the limitations of the Database, therefore, is of growing
importance.
A. The Single Issue Assumption
Among many quantitative empirical scholars, there has long been an
131
assumption that the Supreme Court’s cases are “unidimensional.”
These scholars assume that in deciding a case, the Justices need only
consider their preferences about a single question and that the Justices’
132
preferences “can be arrayed along a single ideological dimension.” This
130. Not every one of the Database’s limitations affects every study, of course. Some scholars do
their own additional coding to compensate for the limitations, and some studies rely on aspects of the
coding that are not implicated by my critiques. In addition, randomly distributed errors will probably
not affect a study’s findings, at least in large scale studies. Here, however, I explore a few examples of
studies that, because of the way they rely on the Database, produce unreliable findings. This
discussion, like the discussion in Part I, is more illustrative than comprehensive.
131. See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 Pol. Analysis 134, 145 (2002) (noting
that the assumption of unidimensionality is made in “nearly all statistical analyses of Supreme Court
behavior”).
132. Edelman & Chen, supra note 81, at 199. Edelman and Chen go on to criticize this assumption
in detail. Id. at 203–09. They note, for example, that a Justice’s response to a case involving a single
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assumption is implicit in the Database’s presumption of only one issue
per case. Unfortunately, sometimes researchers forget that such a
decision imposes an artificial constraint on the Database coding that may
misrepresent the underlying cases.
1. The Median Justice
In a recent law review article, for example, prominent political
scientists and empirical legal scholars Andrew Martin, Kevin Quinn, and
Lee Epstein present a methodology (relying on methods previously
133
developed by Martin and Quinn ) for identifying the “median justice”
134
for each Term. For each Term, they identify the Justice who is most
likely to be the swing vote, and they quantify that likelihood in what they
call “median justice scores,” which they make available for other scholars
135
to use.
The authors’ methodology—which is likely to be (at best) opaque to
136
many legal academics —rests in part on a principle known as the
Median Voter Theorem. The details of the Median Voter Theorem are
largely unimportant here; what is significant is its requirement that the
137
matters voted on be unidimensional. In the absence of such a “single138
dimension issue space,” the Median Voter Theorem is significantly less
powerful. As a result, if a substantial proportion of Supreme Court cases
involve more than one issue, the authors’ identification of median
justices is less reliable.
The authors conclude, however, that they need not be concerned
about this problem:
We too can identify particular cases that violate the condition of a
single-dimension issue space but, as it turns out, the great majority of
disputes before the Supreme Court do not. For example, of the 8,889
cases in which the Court heard oral arguments and decided between
the 1953 and 2002 terms, only 3.79 percent (n=337) contained more
than one issue (e.g., a case that raised questions about federal taxation
139
and federalism).

issue, such as abortion, may include competing preferences that are sometimes explicitly incorporated
into the law in the form of a balancing test. Id. at 205–06.
133. Martin et al., supra note 2, at 1279 & n.17.
134. Id. at 1279.
135. Id. at 1302–03.
136. Farnsworth, supra note 17, at 144.
137. Martin et al., supra note 2, at 1281.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1284 n.35. My calculation of the proportion of multi-issue cases in the Database results
in a somewhat higher, but still small, percentage (8.6%). See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
Edelman and Chen criticize the authors’ methodology on a number of grounds. See Edelman & Chen,
supra note 81, at 203. Among other things, they point out that the authors’ technical description of
their own methodology does not make sense. Id. at 204. They also argue that the Database’s issue
coding is unlikely to accurately identify cases involving single-dimension issue space, and they consider
whether the number of legal provisions coded in a case might help in identifying the number of issue
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But because the Database operates with a presumption of only one issue
per case, the authors should not rely on the paucity of multi-issue cases in
140
the Database as evidence that most cases in fact involve only one issue.
Such reliance is bootstrapping and it calls the authors’ underlying
assumption of unidimensionality into question, likewise calling into
141
question their findings—the median justice scores. And since other
scholars are likely to rely on those scores in their own work, the
limitations of the Database are likely to be magnified by repetition—a
142
multiplier effect of sorts.
2. Case Complexity
It is likewise problematic to draw conclusions about case complexity
from the Database without properly considering Spaeth’s coding
protocols. One study, for example, purports to measure case complexity
by counting the number of legal provisions and (what the study calls)
“legal issues” coded for each case in the Database, and it concludes that
143
more complex cases lead to more separate opinions. But given the
dimensions. See id. at 204–06. They conclude, however, that more than one legal provision might relate
to the same issue, while, on the other hand, it is possible that the same legal provision—for example,
equal protection—could be relevant to multiple dimensions. Id. at 207.
140. This criticism arguably holds even if the authors agree with Spaeth’s decision to code public
policy context rather than legal issue.
141. In fairness, the authors of The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court do not rely
solely on the Database for their claim that most Supreme Court cases are single issue cases. They also
cite Bernard Grofman and Timothy J. Brazill, Identifying the Median Justice on the Supreme Court
Through Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis of “Natural Courts” 1953–1991, 112 Pub. Choice 55
(2002). Grofman and Brazill find that, using a statistical technique called multidimensional scaling
(MDS), a one-dimensional statistical model explains over 80% of the variation in the votes. Id. at 58.
Even in their model, however, close to 20% of the variation in votes goes unexplained. Id. Moreover,
their model operates on an assumption that each individual Justice operates along a single dimension,
discounting the possibility that individual Justices evaluate cases and issues from more than one
perspective. Id. As noted, this assumption may be unwarranted. See supra note 132. Even to the extent
that Grofman and Brazill’s conclusions about unidimensionality are warranted, that does not mean
that the Spaeth Database accurately identifies that dimension with its issue coding.
142. For the most part, the authors’ identification of each Term’s median justice is unsurprising.
But the mere identification of the median justice does not add a lot of new information to the study of
the Supreme Court. Most observers of the Court know who the key swing voters are and how the
Justices generally line up from left to right. See Farnsworth, supra note 17, at 1894 (noting “everyone
already knows” that “each Justice predictably votes with certain colleagues and not others”). It is the
quantification that is new—the effort to put a precise number on the likelihood of a Justice to be the
median in any given case during each Term. And it is this quantification, with the apparent precision
of numbers—numbers with lots of digits after the decimal point—that the researchers’ use of the
Database renders unreliable. See Edelman & Chen, supra note 81, at 218–19 (arguing that the median
justice is not necessarily the most powerful Justice, and demonstrating an alternative methodology to
identify Justices most likely to be in winning coalitions).
143. Scott P. Johnson, The Influence of Case Complexity on the Opinion Writing of the Rehnquist
Court, 25 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 45, 47 (1999). Johnson is not the only one to erroneously equate case
complexity wholly or in part with the number of issues coded in the Database. See, e.g., Robert J.
Hume, The Use of Rhetorical Sources by the U.S. Supreme Court, 40 Law & Soc’y Rev. 817, 826 (2006);
Johnson et al., supra note 67, at 361. Another example of reliance on the number of issues coded is
Solimine and Gely, supra note 9.
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Database’s coding protocols, the author may have gotten the causation
backwards. Spaeth codes more than one issue “only when a preference
144
for one [issue] rather than the other cannot readily be made.” It is at
least plausible that Spaeth is more likely to find this criterion met in
cases that involve more opinions. The same may be true for legal
provisions. If a Justice writes separately to emphasize a particular legal
provision, it is probably more likely that the majority will choose to
address the same provision, which in turn probably makes it more likely
that the syllabus would mention additional legal provisions. Put another
way, by failing to account for the relationship between the Database’s
coding protocols and the reported data, the author is confusing
correlation—between issues and opinions, and between legal provisions
and opinions—with causation. This author may be correct that case
complexity leads the Justices to write more opinions, but there is no way
to know based on the Database.
3. Tracking Use of Precedent
One recent study—one of several recent efforts to examine the use
of precedent—used Shepard’s as a first step to identifying precedents
145
upon which subsequent cases rely. The author noted, however, that
Shepard’s is overinclusive for the purpose of looking at the way
precedent substantively affects later cases because it identifies all later
opinions that cite an earlier case, regardless of the role that the earlier
146
case plays in the later one. In order to narrow the sample to precedents
and later cases that are substantively related to each other, the author
147
turned to the Database’s issue and issue area. If the Database coded an
earlier case and a later case with identical issues, the earlier case was
designated a “precedent” and the later case was identified as relying on
that precedent. If the Database coded earlier and later cases with
different issue areas, they were not considered related; the earlier case
was not identified as precedent for the later one. Where the Database
coded the earlier case and the later case with different issues within the
same issue area, however, the author made a case-by-case determination
about whether the cases were closely enough related for the first case to
count as a precedent for the second. Cases coded for habeas and cruel
and unusual punishment, for example, might be considered to involve
148
“equal contexts” and, if so, were retained in the sample.
The author’s willingness to look at the context beyond the issue
codes is an important recognition that the coding may be best used as a

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 42.
Lim, supra note 68, at 733–34.
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id.
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guide. But the study’s reliance on issue and issue area codes nonetheless
affects the reliability of its results. Automatic elimination of cases in
different issue areas may have caused the author to eliminate cases from
the study that in fact are related. For example, two cases involving the
same procedural issue might be coded with completely different issue
areas depending on their factual contexts. In Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, the Court described the proper approach for courts
149
to take when evaluating a motion for a directed verdict. Because the
Court explained that the analysis for such motions is the same as for
motions for summary judgment, it relied heavily on key summary
150
judgment precedents, in particular Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. Yet
Anderson, which was a libel case, has a First Amendment issue area
code, while Reeves, an employment discrimination case, is coded only as
151
a civil rights case. As a result, Anderson would not be included as
precedent for Reeves in the study, even though Reeves explicitly and
extensively relied on the earlier case for its analysis of the procedural
152
issue.
B. The Problem of Interaction Effects: The First Amendment
Scholars are increasingly interested in the way that different legal
issues or provisions interact, or whether they operate differently in
different contexts—what I will call interaction effects. These interaction
effects, however, are precisely what the Database’s structure makes
difficult or impossible to track.
In Trumping the First Amendment, for example, prominent political
scientists Jeffrey Segal and Lee Epstein examine the extent to which the
Justices are more likely to vote against First Amendment speech rights in
what they describe as “value-conflict” cases—situations in which First
Amendment values are in conflict with “other constitutional or political
value[s],” such as equality, privacy, or due process—than in “pure cases,”
153
where there are no such conflicts. They conclude that a commitment to
First Amendment values—a commitment historically associated with
149. 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000).
150. Id. at 149–51 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–50 (1986)).
151. See Supreme Court Data, supra note 4.
152. Anderson was one of three cases known as the summary judgment trilogy. Arthur R. Miller,
The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency
Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982, 984 (2003).
The other cases are Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–86
(1986), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The trilogy is often credited with
signaling the lower courts that they should grant summary judgment more willingly, and the cases are
frequently discussed as a group. See, e.g., Miller, supra, at 984–85 (blaming “an expansive reading of
the trilogy” for lower courts’ undue willingness to grant summary judgment). Yet the three cases do
not share any issue area codes. Matsushita is coded as an economic activity case, Celotex as a judicial
power case, and Anderson as a First Amendment case. See Supreme Court Data, supra note 4.
153. Epstein & Segal, supra note 69.
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more liberal Justices and more liberal eras of the Court—is significantly
154
less pronounced, indeed may be absent, in value-conflict cases. Put
another way, liberal Justices, they conclude, while more likely than their
conservative brethren to vote to uphold First Amendment rights in pure
cases, are, if anything, less likely to do so in value-conflict cases. Epstein
and Segal, however, fail to consider the possibility that what they observe
is at least in part an artifact of the Database. To be clear: Epstein and
Segal’s conclusions are not necessarily wrong. But they are unreliable
because of the way they use the Database.
The explanation that follows is not simple, but that is in part why it is
so important. Esptein and Segal are leading scholars of the Supreme
Court and their conclusions are likely to garner attention if not
deference. Scholars reading Epstein and Segal’s study, however, are very
unlikely to discern the problems that I identify. Those problems become
apparent only through an analysis of the relationship between their
methods and assumptions and Spaeth’s coding protocols. Specifically, I
will explain (1) how Epstein and Segal identify cases that involve the
First Amendment, (2) how they distinguish between pure and valueconflict cases, (3) how those decisions interact with the Database’s
coding protocols, and finally (4) why the coding protocols render their
findings unreliable.
To identify cases that involve the First Amendment, Epstein and
Segal look at the issue, issue area, and legal provision variables. Any case
for which there is a “First Amendment” code for legal provision is
included in their sample. Likewise, any case for which there is a First
Amendment issue area and a First Amendment speech-related issue
155
code (as opposed to the religion-related codes) is also included. So far
so good. Relying on both issue and legal provision codes to identify First
Amendment cases avoids at least some of the underinclusiveness that can
arise when a researcher relies only on issue coding to identify cases in a
certain area. It is a partial correction for the problem of Spaeth’s
156
unidimensional issue coding—and one that he recommends himself.
Having identified this universe of First Amendment cases, the
authors then divide them into their two categories: pure cases and valueconflict cases. Recall that they define a value-conflict case as one in
which values other than free speech—values including (but not limited
to) equality, privacy, or due process—come in conflict with First
154. Id. at 81.
155. The specific issue codes allow the authors to weed out First Amendment cases coded as
involving religion. Spaeth also has identified separate legal provision codes for the First Amendment
religion clauses and the speech clause. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 37.
156. Id. at 47. Because legal provisions are themselves underreported, it is likely that even Epstein
and Segal inadvertently exclude some First Amendment cases from their sample. See discussion infra
Part III.B.2. It is not obvious, however, that such underreporting likely has a systematic skew.
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Amendment values, while a pure case involves only the First
Amendment. To make the distinction between these types of cases
within their universe of First Amendment cases, they rely on Spaeth’s
157
issue area code. They define a pure case as one in which the issue code
158
falls in the First Amendment issue area. This criterion captures cases
like Texas v. Johnson, the case in which the Court struck down a statute
159
outlawing flag burning. They identify value-conflict cases, on the other
hand, as cases in which the issue code falls in a non–First Amendment
issue area. Schenck is therefore identified as a value-conflict case. Its
legal provision is coded as the First Amendment, but its issue code is
160
abortion.
This approach is open to a variety of criticisms. For one thing, there
is no particular reason to think that the cases they have identified as
value-conflict cases necessarily involve conflicts. Sometimes, the different
values might point in the same ideological direction. In Rust v. Sullivan,
for example, the Supreme Court upheld regulations prohibiting family
planning clinics from providing information about abortion if they
161
received federal funds. Unlike Schenck, Rust did not pit liberal First
Amendment values against the liberal position on abortion rights. To the
contrary, both claims pointed in the same ideological direction.
Nonetheless, due to its “privacy” issue area, Epstein and Segal classify
162
Rust as a value-conflict case.
Second, many cases in the Database, and therefore in Trumping the
First Amendment, are coded as involving a First Amendment issue even
though they have nothing whatsoever to do with the First Amendment.
Epstein and Segal’s sample contains, for example, a set of cases from the
Warren Court involving challenges to anti-Communist measures such as
loyalty oaths or to decisions to hold someone in contempt of Congress
157. Epstein & Segal, supra note 69.
158. Id.
159. 491 U.S. 397, 419–20 (1989).
160. Epstein and Segal acknowledge that in some sense every case is a value-conflict case. Epstein
& Segal, supra note 69, at 94 n.49. Texas v. Johnson, for example, could be seen as involving a conflict
between freedom of expression values on the one hand with respect for the symbol of the flag and all
it represents. Although Epstein and Segal do not say so explicitly, it appears that they are specifically
interested in cases in which a (liberal) vote in favor of First Amendment rights would be a vote against
some other ideologically liberal value or position. It is worth noting here that I am able to undertake
this dissection of Epstein and Spaeth’s work only because they (1) explicitly set forth most of their
coding protocols in their article, and (2) make their data available. Lee Epstein’s Dataverse,
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/lepstein/faces/study/StudyPage.jsp;jsessionid=900c9f506555e0310c140
985dd33.dvnInstance1?studyId=735 (last visited Feb. 14, 2009). These are norms that legal academics
would do well to adopt. See generally Epstein & King, supra note 2.
161. 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991).
162. Rust v. Sullivan is not the only case where the different values do not in fact conflict
ideologically. See e.g., In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 639–40 (1959) (reversing disciplinary action by state
bar of lawyer representing defendants in anti-Communist activity trial; coded with First Amendment
and Attorneys issue areas; identified as value conflict by Epstein and Segal).
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for refusing to answer particular questions under oath. Under Spaeth’s
coding protocols, these cases have First Amendment issue areas even
when they in fact involved, for example, due process challenges, and
even when they contain either no mention of or only a passing reference
to the First Amendment. Relying on Spaeth’s coding, Epstein and Segal
nonetheless classify such cases as “pure” First Amendment cases. This
practice increases the number of Warren Court cases counted as decided
in favor of the First Amendment (or as cases in which the more liberal
164
Justices so voted). The study might therefore overstate the rate at
which the Warren Court (or its liberal Justices) voted in favor of First
Amendment values, thereby overstating the difference between the
Warren Court (or its liberal Justices) and subsequent, less “liberal”
165
Courts and Justices.
163. See, e.g., Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 288 (1961) (finding statutorilyrequired loyalty oath void for vagueness in violation of due process); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers’
Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 899 (1961) (upholding against due process challenge
military officer’s decision not to allow civilian worker on base); Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456,
472 (1961) (reversing contempt of Congress conviction on due process grounds); Konigsberg v. State
Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961) (upholding state bar decision to deny admission for applicant’s
refusal to answer question about Communist activities); Nelson v. County of L.A., 362 U.S. 1, 9 (1960)
(upholding dismissal of social workers for refusing to answer questions from a congressional
committee); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959) (reversing administrative decision,
unsupported by congressional or presidential authority, to deprive government contractor of his
position); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958) (holding that the Secretary of State did not have
authority to issue regulation denying passports to Communists); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178, 216 (1957) (striking down contempt of Congress conviction on due process grounds); Slochower v.
Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956) (reversing summary termination of professor who invoked his
right against self-incrimination); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 349 (1955) (striking down actions of
Loyalty Board); Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 456 (1954) (upholding suspension of
physician’s license following conviction for refusing to produce subpoenaed documents).
164. Epstein and Segal would likely respond to this critique by pointing out that what they purport
to be measuring is the likelihood that the Court rules in favor of “First Amendment values,” not
necessarily in favor of First Amendment rights themselves. Most readers of their article, however, are
unlikely to make such a subtle distinction. For one thing, the authors themselves describe the cases
they are looking at as involving “First Amendment claims” and as cases in which “the First
Amendment guarantees of press, speech, assembly, or association were at stake.” Epstein & Segal,
supra note 69, at 81, 92 (emphasis added). Lawyers reading such descriptions would certainly assume
that the cases in fact involve the First Amendment, not simply related “values.”
165. These Cold War cases suggest other interesting challenges for Epstein and Segal. The Warren
Court decided this series of cases in part because there were such cases to decide during the Cold War.
Theoretically, therefore, the Warren Court’s apparent favoring of First Amendment values relative to
subsequent Courts could reflect instead a contemporaneous antipathy towards First Amendment
values by other government actors, leading to this series of cases. See Barbara Graham, Explaining
Supreme Court Policymaking in Civil Rights: The Influence of the Solicitor General, 1953–2002, 31
Pol’y Stud. J. 253, 261–62 (2003) (explaining shift in Court’s treatment in race discrimination cases in
part due to a change in the nature of the cases the Court was handling—a change from identifying
constitutional violations to remedying them); see also Jonathan P. Kastellec & Jeffrey R. Lax, Can We
Ignore Case Selection When We Study Judicial Politics? (Oct. 22, 2007) (unpublished paper prepared
for the Second Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951873 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s case selection has substantial
implications for empirical scholars trying to draw conclusions about the Court’s decision making).
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Most importantly, however, Epstein and Segal’s approach leads
them to any case as pure that involves values other than free expression
so long as the issue code for the case is within the First Amendment area.
To explain: in the Database, some cases have both a First Amendment
legal provision and First Amendment issue code. Epstein and Segal code
these cases as pure cases. Other cases have a First Amendment legal
provision and a non–First Amendment issue code. These cases are
identified as value-conflict cases. But what of a case that has a non–First
Amendment legal provision but a First Amendment issue code? These
cases (which I will call hybrid cases), under Epstein and Segal’s
protocols, are coded as pure cases—but this coding is likely to be
166
wrong. And that systematic misclassification presents a problem for
Epstein and Segal’s findings.
To understand why hybrid cases may well be misclassified as pure
cases, it is important to remember two aspects of Spaeth’s issue coding.
First, Spaeth does not purport to code legal issues—so a case like
Schenck in which all the legal analysis centered on the First Amendment
is nonetheless coded as a privacy case because it involves abortion
protesters. Second, Spaeth, by design, almost always codes only one issue
per case. This aspect of the coding requires him to try to identify one—
and only one—“public policy context” for each case.
Spaeth provides no guidance about how that determination is made.
It stands to reason, however, that the decision rests in large part on what
aspect of the case is emphasized by the Justices themselves. So, in
Schenck, where the Court upholds part of the injunction against abortion
protesters—where, in Epstein and Segal’s terms, abortion rights trump
167
the First Amendment—Spaeth gives the case an abortion issue.
On the other hand, in a case where the competing value does not
trump the First Amendment, it seems more likely that Spaeth would
code the case with a First Amendment issue. Republican Party of
168
Minnesota v. White, for example, is coded with a First Amendment
169
issue and, therefore, is identified as a pure case by Epstein and Segal.
And indeed, the majority decided the case, striking down limitations on
170
The
judicial candidates’ speech, on First Amendment grounds.
dissenters, however, emphasized their concerns about due process and

166. Similarly, and without explanation, Epstein and Segal identify cases with more than one issue
as pure cases as long as any one of the issues is a First Amendment issue. See, for example,
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), which is coded by Spaeth as having both a First
Amendment and a federalism issue, but is coded by Epstein and Segal as a “pure”
First Amendment case. Lee Epstein’s Dataverse, supra note 160.
167. See Supreme Court Data, supra note 4.
168. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
169. See Supreme Court Data, supra note 4.
170. White, 536 U.S. at 788.
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judicial impartiality. The case is, therefore, more accurately described
as a value-conflict case.
The combined effect of Spaeth’s coding with Epstein and Segal’s
protocols is that value-conflict cases resolved in favor of First
Amendment rights, like Republican Party of Minnesota, appear less
likely to be identified as value-conflict cases than are value-conflict cases
resolved against First Amendment values. This likely systematic bias
renders Epstein and Segal’s conclusions unreliable because their
identification of pure versus value-conflict cases may not be independent
of the case outcome. Put another way, their coding protocols mean that
they may systematically undercount the number of value-conflict cases
resolved in favor of First Amendment values and—particularly for cases
during the Warren Court era—they may overcount the number of “pure”
cases decided in favor of those values. As a result, their calculation of the
proportions of value-conflict cases resolved for and against First
172
Amendment values is in question. At worst, they are wrong that liberal
Justices are significantly more likely to rule against First Amendment
rights in value-conflict cases than in pure cases, because they have not
accurately identified many value-conflict cases, particularly those in
which the First Amendment rights are upheld. Or perhaps they are right
but they overstate the results. Or perhaps ultimately, following recoding
to account for my critique, there would be little or no change in their
173
results. We do not know. As it stands, however, what we know is that
their conclusions are unreliable.
To emphasize—the problems here arise primarily from Spaeth’s
guideline that (almost) every case have only one issue code, combined
171. Id. at 797–803 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 803–21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
172. Additionally, in part due to Spaeth’s failure to consistently code legal provisions, discussed in
detail in Part III, their sample entirely omits cases that should be included. See, e.g., Cal. Bankers
Ass’n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 56 (1974) (holding, inter alia, that First Amendment freedom of
association claims of the ACLU were not yet justiciable).
173. Any of these outcomes are possible. Some cases wrongly coded as pure cases have a majority
of conservative Justices who decide the case in favor of “First Amendment values” and a group of
liberal Justices who dissent, emphasizing other values. Republican Party of Minnesota is just such a
case. Were it correctly classified as a value-conflict case, it would therefore support Epstein and
Segal’s conclusions. And there are other such cases. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 571 (2001) (finding, by conservative majority, some tobacco advertising regulations
unconstitutional and finding others preempted by federal law). On the other hand, there are some
cases, likewise wrongly designated as pure, in which some or all of the liberal Justices reject the
competing values and vote in favor of First Amendment values. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111, 133 (1979) (holding that certain statements by U.S. Senator were not subject to immunity
and that target of those statements was not a public figure for purposes of libel; Justice Brennan was
the only dissenter). Such cases detract from Epstein and Segal’s claims. These two types of cases have
offsetting effects on Epstein and Segal’s results, but, depending on how many of each there are, they
may not completely offset each other. A wholesale recoding of Epstein and Segal’s cases would also
require identifying cases involving the First Amendment that are not included in their sample because
they lack the necessary First Amendment issue and legal provision codes.
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with his decision not to code legal issues at all. This is an artificial
constraint that means that the Database does not necessarily report
accurate information about the cases. Moreover, this coding constraint
necessarily requires judgments about the most salient public policy
174
context for each case. Those judgments, however, are invisible and are
based on unarticulated criteria, creating traps for scholars who, like
Epstein and Segal, want to understand how different areas of the law
interact, rendering their conclusions unreliable.

III. The Scope of the Problems: The Recoding Project
In the previous Part, I described the how Database’s coding
protocols have the potential to affect the findings of empirical legal
scholars who use the Database but fail to fully appreciate its limitations.
The extent to which their findings would actually be different, of course,
depends on how they use the Database, how widespread the problems
are within the Database, and how and if those problems impose a bias or
skew on the data that is relevant to each project. A more general version
of this question is: to what extent would a coding protocol more sensitive
to the nuances of legal doctrine yield significantly and systematically
different coding and presumably, therefore, different research results in
at least some studies? How accurate is the information recorded in the
Database, how much information goes unrecorded, and does that
information have any notable characteristics?
A. The Recoding Project
To get at the answers to these questions, I undertook a recoding
project (the Recoding Project), focused on issue, issue area, and legal
provision. I recoded a sample of ninety-five cases—a 10% random
sample from the cases decided during the last Rehnquist Natural
175
Court. My goals in the Recoding Project were severalfold. First, I

174. See Anna Harvey, What Makes a Judgment ‘Liberal’? Coding Bias in the United States
Supreme Court Database (unpublished paper prepared for the Third Annual Conference on
Empirical Legal Studies), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120970
(arguing that the identity of the Justices in the majority and the dissent may influence selection of the
ideology and issue codes).
175. The sample was generated by Stata 9. Stata is a commercial statistical software package used
to analyze, manage, and present data. See generally Alan C. Acock, A Gentle Introduction to
Stata (2d ed. 2008); Stata: Data Analysis and Statistical Software, www.stata.com (last visited Feb. 14,
2009) (providing information about Stata). I define an individual case as an opinion with a unique case
citation. I included only cases with published opinions of the Court. I selected the last Rehnquist
Natural Court for purposes of manageability. The findings I report here must therefore be understood
within that context. For a list of all the cases used in the Recoding Project, see infra Appendix 2. The
Recoding Project Data and Codebook can be found online. See Carolyn Shapiro Dataverse,
Replication Data for: Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme
Court, http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/shapiro/faces/study/StudyPage.jsp?studyId=38080 (last visited
Feb. 14, 2009).
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wanted to test the scope of the limitations I had identified. For this
reason, I wanted my coding to be fairly comparable to Spaeth’s. Second,
and in some tension with the first goal, I wanted to experiment with a
coding protocol that would code information in the cases more
accurately and comprehensively than Spaeth does. Finally, I wanted to
develop insights into the challenges of coding in ways that meaningfully
report law and legal doctrine, with the hope that the lessons learned in
this project would be useful to myself and others in the future.
My protocols for coding the key variables were different from
Spaeth’s in a number of important respects. I summarize a few of the
major differences here. More details about the recoding methodology are
reported in Appendix A.
1. Issues and Issue Areas
(a) Rather than define issues and issue areas as the “public policy
context in which the case arose,” I defined them as legal issues.
(b) There was no limit to the number of legal issues that could be
coded per case.
(c) Instead of making issue area derivative of issue, my protocol was
to identify the issue area first. Similar issues therefore are more likely to
appear in more than one issue area in my coding than in the Original
Database.
(d) I created a number of issues and issue areas that did not
previously exist. The new issue areas are:
(1) Federal Government Operations and Structure
(2) State/Local Government Operations and Structure
(3) Intellectual Property
(4) Environment
(5) Immigration
(6) Native Americans
(7) Military
(e) In addition, I rearranged some of Spaeth’s coding, moving issues
to different areas when I felt it appropriate, and I renamed and expanded
two issue areas. Spaeth’s issue area “Attorneys” became “Lawyers and
Legal Profession” and his issue area “Unions” became “Employment.”
(f) I eliminated the Original Database’s “Privacy” issue area. I
placed issues related to abortion and other substantive due process
concerns in the “Due Process” issue area, and I moved issues related to
statutes like the Freedom of Information Act to “Federal Government
Operations and Structure,” a new issue area.
These and the other changes described in Appendix A obviously
affect the types of comparisons that can be made between my coding and
Spaeth’s, and I take account of these changes in my discussion below.
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2. Legal Provision
I define legal provision as a statute, constitutional provision, legal
doctrine, treaty, or seminal case. The italicized words highlight the
difference between my theory of coding legal provisions and Spaeth’s—
notably, that I included legal doctrines and seminal cases. And of course
I did not identify legal provisions by reading the syllabi or summaries of
the case, but rather by reading the opinions themselves. I also looked to
the cases’ Questions Presented for guidance in identifying both legal
176
issues and legal provisions.
177
In general, I defined seminal cases as cases, like Chevron or
178
Mathews v. Eldridge, whose names refer to established legal doctrines.
Where the Court was elaborating on such a doctrine, the case/doctrine
should be coded as a legal provision. On the other hand, where the Court
considered whether or not to distinguish a particular case, such a case is
179
not a legal provision. For example, in Missouri v. Seibert, the Court
considered the application of two precedents. The first was the famous
180
case of Miranda v. Arizona, which announced the requirement that a
suspect in police custody be warned about his right to remain silent
181
before being questioned. The second case was Elstad v. Oregon. In
Elstad, the Court held that where a suspect responded to uncoercive
questions without having been given his Miranda warnings, a subsequent
182
statement, made after warnings were made, was admissible. In Seibert,
the police deliberately withheld Miranda warnings from the suspect in
the hopes that having made incriminating statements once, she would be
183
more likely to do so again after the warnings were given.
Seibert, then, is about whether to extend Elstad to a slightly different
factual situation or whether to distinguish it. Therefore, I did not identify
Elstad as a legal provision. But as the case also involved Miranda
warnings. arising from the paradigmatic seminal case of Miranda v.
Arizona, that case (or the doctrine that arose from it) was identified as a
184
legal provision.

176. See infra Appendix 1.
177. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
178. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
179. 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
180. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
181. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
182. Id. at 318.
183. 542 U.S. at 618. There were also other differences between the factual circumstances of the
two cases, which the Seibert court noted. Id. at 615–16.
184. See supra note 97 (noting that Spaeth himself recognizes the Miranda doctrine as a legal
provision).
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3. Database Architecture
Each case had an unlimited number of records, determined by the
number of legal provisions. Each record identified a single legal
provision. At least one record for each case also identified as many issues
and issue areas as needed to accurately describe the case. The most legal
issues reported in any case in my sample was nine, and the most legal
185
provisions coded was seven.
B. Results
1.

Issue and Issue Area
a. How Many Issues per Case?
One of my most substantial critiques of the Database’s coding
protocols is the presumption in favor of coding only one issue per case.
So perhaps the most important comparison between the original coding
and mine is this: out of the ninety-five cases in my sample, the Original
Database coded only one as involving two issues (each of which appears
in a different issue area). The Database codes all ninety-four other cases
in my sample as having only one issue (and therefore one issue area). By
contrast, in the Recoding Project, eighty-nine cases were identified as
having more than one issue. Even at the more general level of issue area,
I found that seventy-nine cases involved more than one issue area. Table
B sets forth the distribution of issues and issue areas.

185. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), was assigned seven legal provisions; Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (1999), was assigned nine legal issues.
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Table B: Distribution of Issues and Issue Areas in Recoded
Cases
Number of Issues
Identified per
Case

Number of Cases

Number of Issue
Areas Identified per
Case

Number of
Cases

1

6

1

16

2

23

2

40

3

23

3

28

4

13

4

7

5

13

5

4

6

8

6

0

7

5

7

0

8

3

8

0

9

1

9

0

Total

95

Total

95

Another way to look at the data is to compare the mean number of
issues and issue areas coded per case. I found a mean of 3.7 issues and 2.4
issue areas per case, in contrast to the Original Database’s mean of 1.0
issue and issue area per case. Figure 1 illustrates these findings.
By recoding for legal issue (instead of “public policy context”) and
not artificially limiting the number of legal issues per case, the Recoding
Project identified more than three and a half times as many issue codes
and almost two and a half times as many issue area codes as the Original
186
Database. Figure I shows this difference graphically by comparing the
mean number of issues and issue areas coded per case in the Recoding
Project with the mean number of issues and issue areas coded per case in
the Original Database. The additional codes identified through the
Recoding Project represent information that is completely absent in the
Database.

186. The 95% confidence intervals for these sample means do not overlap at all as between the
Original Database coding and the Recoding Project. There is a 95% chance that the actual mean
number of issues and issue areas for Spaeth’s coding for the last Rehnquist Natural Court is between
0.990 and 1.031. There is a 95% chance that were the Recoding Project’s protocol applied to all of the
cases from the last Rehnquist Natural Court, the mean number of issues coded per case would be
between 3.3476 and 4.105032. Likewise, there is a 95% chance that the mean number of issue areas
coded per case would be between 2.197594 and 2.602406.
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0

Mean Coded per Case
1
2
3

4

Figure 1: Issue and Issue Area: Mean Coded per Case
Recoded (Light) and Original (Dark)

Recoded Issues
Recoded Areas

Original Issues
Original Areas

N=95; Issue t=14.2166; Issue Area t=13.5581; p<.05
95% CIs: Recoded - Issue (3.348-4.105), Area (2.200-2.602); Original Issue & Area (0.990-1.031)

Finally, we can compare the percentage of recoded cases that have
more than one legal issue with the Database’s issue coding for the entire
last Rehnquist Natural Court. There are 958 cases in the Database for
that Natural Court. Of those, only forty-nine (5.12%) are coded as
187
having more than one issue. In contrast, in the Recoding Project,
eighty-nine of the ninety-five cases (93.68%) had more than one legal
issue.
Collectively, these results suggest strongly that Spaeth’s presumption
of unidimensionality and his deliberately non-legal protocol for coding
the cases’ public policy issues together mask enormous amounts of
information about legal issues addressed by the Supreme Court. Many of
the works reported in Part II—the efforts to quantify median justice
scores, to relate case complexity to number of opinions written, and to
determine whether an earlier case can be considered a precedent for a
later case by reference to the coded issues and issue areas—all rely in
some way on assumptions that these findings demonstrate are
unwarranted. As a result, those studies are themselves unreliable.

187. To calculate this statistic, I compared the number of unique case citations (analu=0)—958—
with the number of cases in which the Original Database reports multiple issues (analu = 2 and
analu=5). It is not possible to easily calculate the number of issues reported per case, nor is it possible
to determine the number of cases with multiple issue areas.
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b. What Does the Database Tell Us?
The results just described do not, however, tell us anything about the
nature of the information that the Database in fact reports. For example,
are cases like Schenck and Clinton v. Jones—where the issue Spaeth
identified has nothing to do with the legal issues in the case—the
exception or the rule? Since Spaeth himself does not purport to code
legal issues, it would not be surprising to find little overlap between his
issue coding and the Recoding Project.
To evaluate this question, I compared my issue and issue area coding
with Spaeth’s to see how much of the coding overlapped. As long as any
one of the issues I coded was the same as the Original Database’s coding,
I counted it as a match; likewise for the issue areas. (Because Spaeth
coded one case in my sample as having two issues and issue areas, the
total number of issues and issue areas compared here is ninety-six, not
ninety-five.)
Out of the ninety-six issues coded by Spaeth, fifty-seven (59.4%) had
an exact issue match with the Recoding Project. Put another way, just
over 40% of the Database’s issue codes did not precisely match the
recoded legal issues. At the more general level of issue area, however,
the results are more encouraging. Only eighteen (18.8%) issue areas
coded by Spaeth did not match the recoded issue areas. That number
shrinks to nine (9.4%) when I take into account the rearranged issues
and issue codes, crediting a match where the recoded issue area is in
188
some way derivative of Spaeth’s original issue area coding.
These results suggest that, in general, the Database’s issue area
assignments reflect one (but only one) of the legal issue areas in the case.
Put another way, Clinton and Schenck are unusual because the Database
assigns them issue area codes that fail to identify any of the general areas
of law at issue. No such conclusion can be made about the more finegrained issue coding, however. This disparity could be due to a number
of factors, including the difference between public policy context as
coded in the Original Database and the legal issue coded in the Recoding
Project, and the large number of detailed issue codes, which might lead
189
different coders to identify related but not identical issue codes.

188. For this calculation, if I coded a newly created issue area, I checked to see if that new area
was primarily based on one of Spaeth’s issue areas. If so, and if Spaeth coded that original area, I
counted it as a match. In addition, there was one case that Spaeth coded as a privacy case that I also
counted as a match because the case involved abortion rights, newly relocated in the due process issue
area. In this recalculation, there were a total of nine additional cases that I concluded should be
counted as a match. Five of the cases even had identical issue codes in the Original Database and in
mine. Of the remaining nine unmatched cases, Spaeth coded two as privacy cases, three as criminal
cases, two as civil rights cases, and two as economic activity cases.
189. For a discussion of the relative merits of a very detailed coding system versus a more general
one, see infra Part IV.B.
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c. What Kind of Information Is Missing from the Database?
The comparison between the Recoding Project and the Original
Database also provides important insights about what kind of
information tends to go unrecorded in the Database. Tables C and D
highlight the differences between the types of issues coded in the
Recoding Project and in the Original Database. Both tables list the
number of recoded cases that have at least one issue code in each issue
area. In other words, they report the number of recoded cases with a civil
rights issue area code, the number with a criminal code, and so on.
Because my recoding protocol allows multiple issue areas per case, most
cases are counted more than once, and the total number of reported
issue areas is well more than ninety-five. Table C focuses on those issue
areas that are not new, and compares the number of cases in each
recoded issue area that were comparably coded by Spaeth. Table D
focuses on newly-created areas.

Table C: Issue Areas not Newly Created
Issue Area

Number of
Recoded Cases

Number of Such
Cases with a
Matching Issue
Area Code in the
Original Database

Civil Rights

16

9

56.3%

Criminal Procedure

26

13

50.0%

Due Process

17

10

58.8%

Economic Activity

24

16

66.7%

Employment
(Unions)

7

1

14.3%

Federal Taxation

5

4

80.0%

Federalism

19

6

31.6%

First Amendment

10

6

60.0%

Judicial Power

46

12

26.1%

Legal Profession
(Attorneys)

7

1

14.3%

Percentage
Matching
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Table D: Newly Created Issue Areas
Issue Area

Number of Recoded Cases

Native Americans

3

Environment

2

Federal Government

24

Intellectual Property

3

Military

3

State/Local Government

13

Most striking about these results is the extent to which the Database
appears to systematically underreport information about government
structure and operations, about judicial power, and about lawyering. (I
will refer to these kinds of issues as structural and jurisprudential issues.)
The lowest percentage of overlap appears in the issue areas of
Employment and Legal Profession. But this is unsurprising, because I
substantially expanded both of these areas from the preexisting Unions
and Attorneys issue areas. In issue areas that I did not significantly
expand, the lowest overlap, by far, is in the areas of Federalism and
Judicial Power—31.6% and 26.1% respectively. In fact, nearly half of the
recoded cases had a code in the Judicial Power issue area, while only
twelve (12.6%) of the cases were so coded in the Original Database.
(Judicial Power includes such issues as standing, jurisdiction, comity, and
procedure.) Likewise, in the newly created issue areas, Federal
Government Structure and Operations and State/Local Government
Structure and Operations far outstripped any other newly-created issue
area (as well as Employment and Legal Profession) in terms of the sheer
numbers of cases presenting such legal issues.
This finding that structural and jurisprudential issues are
190
underreported is not surprising. Structural issues may be of great
190. My finding that the Database gives short shrift to structural issues is consistent with other
research. In their 2006 article, Michael S. Greve and Jonathan Klick begin an empirical study of
Rehnquist Court cases addressing preemption, a structural issue implicating the relationship between
the states and the federal government. Finding that reliance on “[e]ven the most complete, up-to-date,
and widely-used data set, the United States Supreme Court Judicial Data Base [sic] . . . . contains only
a sample of ‘preemption’ cases—a good number of which do not conform to something a competent
lawyer would recognize as preemption,” the authors generated their own list of preemption cases.
Greve & Klick, supra note 38, at 46. They used several techniques, including a LEXIS keyword search
and “less systematic means, such as reviews of the pertinent legal literature.” Id. at 91–92. Out of their
final list of 105 preemption cases, the Database failed to code thirty-four cases (32.38%) as preemption
cases, underreporting this important structural issue. Id. at 92 n.99. Of the seventy-six cases coded as
preemption cases by the Database, eight were not in fact preemption cases. Id. There are other
preemption studies that rely at least in part on Spaeth’s coding, thereby missing a significant number
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interest and salience to lawyers and judges, and they can be crucial to
certain kinds of legal analysis. They are less likely, however, to be the
kinds of issues that make headlines. Thus, they are much less likely to be
deemed the salient issue area for purposes of identifying the “public
policy context” of a case. At the same time, structural and jurisprudential
issues arise in cases about any and all kinds of other legal issues, from the
First Amendment to environmental law to tax law. Many of these other
legal issues may be more easily characterized as “public policy contexts”
than are structural and jurisprudential issues, and are therefore likely
191
take precedence when a coder must select only one issue per case.
This missing information, however, represents significant lost
opportunities for scholars to investigate the way that law operates—or
does not operate. Tracking the interaction between these structural
issues and other legal issues or public policy contexts, for example, can
illuminate the extent to which the attitudinal model describes the
Justices’ behavior, or the extent to which—whether out of strategic
considerations or a commitment to legal doctrine or for other reasons—
their decisions and votes appear to be affected or dictated by structural
or jurisprudential issues.
Compare, for example, the cases of Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
192
193
Products, Leatherman v. Tarrant Co. Narcotics & Coordination Unit,
194
and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. All three cases addressed the
application of particular Rules of Civil Procedure to a civil rights cause of
action, and all three were decided unanimously in favor of the civil rights
195
plaintiff for reasons relating explicitly to the requirements of the Rules.
Spaeth, however, gives none of the cases an issue code related to

of cases Greve and Klick identified and counting a few that should not have been included. See, e.g.,
Brady Baybeck & William Lowry, Federalism Outcomes and Ideological Preferences: The U.S.
Supreme Court and Preemption Cases, 30 Publius 73, 83–84 (2000); James B. Staab, The Tenth
Amendment and Justice Scalia’s “Split Personality,” 16 J.L. & Pol. 231, 300 n.266 (2000); see also
Whittington, supra note 2, at 506 n.139 (identifying the universe of “federalism” cases as those Spaeth
coded with issue codes 930–49).
191. For her work on tax cases, Professor Staudt has constructed her own database of every
Supreme Court tax case from 1941 through 2004. Staudt et al., supra note 38, at 1815 n.63 (describing
nature and content of LEXIS search). For those years that her database overlaps with the Original
Database, Staudt compared the two and found that the Original Database accurately identified about
88% of the tax cases. E-mail from Nancy Staudt, Class of 1940 Research Professor of Law at
Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Sept. 15, 2008, 15:52:00 CST) (on file with the author).
This substantial overlap is not surprising. Federal taxation is a fairly discrete and easily identifiable
area of law and policy. But these cases may well also involve structural and jurisprudential issues like
federalism, federal government operations and powers, administrative law, and judicial procedure; all
of which are likely to go uncoded as issues in the Database.
192. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). Reeves was in the Recoding Project sample. See infra Appendix 2.
193. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
194. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
195. See generally cases cited supra notes 192–94.
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procedure; all are coded in the Database only as civil rights cases.
Spaeth’s unidimensional issue coding thus makes it very difficult for a
researcher to evaluate the interaction between, for example, procedure
and civil rights.
A related finding emerges from the overwhelming number of cases
that involve more than one issue or issue area. As I have already
discussed, even in cases that do not implicate structural issues, there may
be interaction effects between different legal issues or between legal
issues and their factual or public policy contexts. Spaeth’s unidimensional
issue coding masks these effects, and makes it impossible to make
meaningful findings about the way those effects operate in different cases
197
and across different issues and issue areas.
This problem arose for Trumping the First Amendment, discussed in
Part II. But it can extend to numerous other areas of law. Consider the
198
case of Gonzales v. Raich. In that case, the Court had to decide
whether the Commerce Clause permits the federal government to outlaw
199
intrastate production and use of marijuana for medical purposes. The
case was widely understood to pit the Justices’ positions on federalism
and congressional power against their likely policy preferences about
200
medical marijuana. Would the liberal Justices who favor robust
congressional and federal power be willing to uphold a federal regulation
that deprives terribly ill patients of relief? And would the conservative
Justices who generally favor more limited federal power be willing to
strike down an anti-drug law? Full coding of all aspects of the opinion—
and comparable full coding of other cases—are necessary for researchers
201
But as the Recoding Project
to study these interaction effects.
demonstrates, the magnitude of the unidentified interaction effects is
potentially enormous. Future research and coding efforts must work to
alleviate this problem.
2. Legal Provision
As with legal issues, the Recoding Project reveals that Spaeth fails to
report significant numbers of legal provisions that in fact play a role in
196. The Database does not even identify the Rules of Civil Procedure as a legal provision for
Reeves, although it does for both Leatherman and Swierkiewicz. See Supreme Court Data, supra note
4. The problem of underreported legal provisions is discussed in the following subsection.
197. Cf. Edelman & Chen, supra note 81; Fischman & Law, supra note 50.
198. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
199. Id. at 5.
200. For a particularly entertaining discussion of the Justices’ dilemmas in this case, see Dahlia
Lithwick, Dude, Where’s My Integrity? Medical Marijuana Tests the Supreme Court’s True Love of
Federalism, Slate, Nov. 29, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2110204; see also Michael C. Dorf, Whose
Ox is Being Gored? When Attitudinalism Meets Federalism, 21 St. John’s J. Legal Comment. 497, 507–
12 (2007); Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After
Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 1–3 (2005).
201. Raich’s only issue code is in the federalism issue area. See Supreme Court Data, supra note 4.
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the cases. Spaeth’s protocols are not consistently applied to the cases in
the Database, and due to limitations both in the protocols and in their
application, as with legal issues, legal provisions likely to implicate
structural issues are often omitted.
a. How Many Legal Provisions per Case?
Although Spaeth does not explicitly discourage coding of multiple
legal provisions per case, the Database in fact coded only a tiny
proportion of cases in my sample—six (6.3%)—as having more than one
legal provision. It coded the vast majority of the cases—seventy-nine
(83.2%)—as having only one legal provision, and an additional ten
(10.5%) cases were coded as having no legal provisions. In contrast, the
Recoding Project identified substantially higher numbers of legal
provisions—more than two-thirds had more than one legal provision, and
no cases had no legal provisions. As Figure 2 shows, the mean number of
legal provisions per case in the Recoding Project was 2.2; for the same
cases as coded in the Original Database, the mean was 1.0.

0

.5

Mean Coded per Case
1
1.5

2

Figure 2: Legal Provision: Mean Coded Per Case
Recoded (Light) and Original (Dark)

Recoded Legal Provisions

Original Legal Provisions

N=95; t=8.3327; p<.05

95% CIs: Recoded LP (1.94164-2.45836); Original LP (0.87749-1.12252)

The Database’s coding for legal provision, in comparison to the
Recoding Project, captures only about half of the legal provisions
actually considered or at issue in the cases.
Finally, we can compare the percentage of recoded cases that have
more than one legal provision with Spaeth’s legal provision coding for
the entire final Rehnquist Natural Court. There are 958 cases in the
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Database for that Natural Court. Of those, only 143 (14.9%) are coded as
202
having more than one legal provision. In contrast, in my sample, sixtythree of the ninety-five cases (66.3%) had more than one legal provision.
b. How Much Overlap Is There with the Database Coding?
Out of the ninety-four legal provisions identified in the Database,
203
three were substantively wrong. Additionally, seven legal provisions
204
contained typos. The remaining eighty-four legal provisions identified
205
by the Database matched the Recoding Project.
c. What Is Missing from the Database?
But what of the legal provisions that the Database fails to identify?
Only a relatively small proportion of the total recoded legal provisions—
eight (4.0%)—were legal provisions that Spaeth himself would not have
recognized as such. In other words, in my sample, legal provisions not
based on a statute, constitutional provision, or court rule—such as the
doctrine of qualified immunity or the question of Chevron deference—
did not account for many of the missing codes. In addition, the Recoding
Project identified fourteen legal provisions that arose in the Questions
Presented but that were not considered or relied on by any of the
opinions. These legal provisions, as well, were not encompassed by
Spaeth’s coding protocols.
As for the remaining legal provision codes, once again, the Database
appears to give short shrift to codes that often relate to structural issues.
Eighteen recoded cases identified a state or local statute or court rule as
202. To calculate this statistic, I compared the number of unique case citations (analu=0)—958—
with the number of cases in which the Original Database reports multiple legal provisions (analu = 3
and analu=5). It is not possible to easily calculate the number of legal provisions Spaeth coded per
case.
203. For example, Spaeth codes the legal provision in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995), as 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which is the statute authorizing federal
question jurisdiction in the federal courts. But Grubart is about maritime jurisdiction. 513 U.S. at 529.
The correct legal provision is 28 U.S.C. § 1333, the statute authorizing maritime jurisdiction. Likewise,
in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433–34 (2001), the Court
addressed the substantive limits that the Fourteenth Amendment places on punitive damages. The
only legal provision that Spaeth codes is the Fifth Amendment.
204. For example, Spaeth codes the legal provision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 139 (2001), as 33 U.S.C. § 1334, when the correct
legal provision is 33 U.S.C. § 1344. (33 U.S.C. § 1334 does not exist.) In addition, a number of legal
provisions in which the statute is labeled with a five-digit section number contain only four of those
digits. (Spaeth acknowledges that the Database sometimes so codes such five-digit statutes. Codebook
2008, supra note 28, at 33.) See, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000) (addressing 49
U.S.C. § 20106; coded in Database as 49 U.S.C. § 2010); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Hiles, 516 U.S. 400
(1996) (addressing 49 U.S.C. § 20302; coded in Database as 49 U.S.C. § 2030).
205. In calculating this match, I counted as legal provisions as matching if they identified the same
statute, even if they used different notation. Some statutes can be identified by an abbreviation of their
popular name, but statutes may also be identified by citation. Likewise, a citation might be to the first
section of a statute or to a particular section within it. For some discussion on the challenges of coding
statutes, see infra Part IV.B.
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a legal provision considered by the Court. Spaeth’s coding protocol
explicitly provides for identifying such legal provisions (using the code
STATE), but he does not in fact identify a single one of the eighteen. Yet
Supreme Court cases that involve a state law often implicate—in some
206
way—the relationship between the states and the federal government.
Likewise, out of ten cases I coded as having habeas corpus legal
provisions—cases that are quite likely to implicate the federal courts’
right to intervene in state judicial systems or the relationship between the
executive and the judiciary—Spaeth identified only three.
The most surprising finding, however, relates to the accuracy of
Spaeth’s reliance on cases’ syllabi to code his legal provisions. I expected
that almost all of the missing legal provisions would, as in AlmendarezTorres, be missing because they were not explicitly mentioned in the
syllabus. This, however, did not turn out to be the case. Instead, what I
found was that Spaeth frequently failed to code legal provisions that, by
his own coding protocols, he should identify. Of the eighteen uncoded
state laws, for example, all but four were mentioned in the numbered
207
holdings of their cases’ syllabi.
There were, besides the eighteen missing state codes and the handful
of non–statutory based legal provisions, eighty-eight legal provisions that
I identified but Spaeth did not. Seven of those legal provisions were
attributable to decisions I made to provide more detail than Spaeth—
coding individual rules of civil procedure separately, for example, instead
of identifying the rules in general as a single legal provision. Of the
remaining eighty-one legal provisions, twenty-seven were squarely cited
in the appropriate portion of the syllabus. Another sixteen were referred
to indirectly in the syllabus, without an explicit citation, and another four
were referred to in the syllabus, but not in a numbered holding—the part
to which Spaeth looks. In contrast, I identified only ten legal provisions
that were relied on or considered in the text of an opinion but went
unmentioned in the syllabus. Table E sets forth the categories and

206. Readers familiar with the Database might wonder whether the STATE code is necessary to
identify cases that address state laws. One of Spaeth’s codes—authority for decision—identifies cases
in which the Court is engaged in judicial review of state action or law for constitutionality. But this
code is both underinclusive and overinclusive. It is underinclusive because not every case in which the
Court considers a state law receives this code, even under Spaeth’s coding protocols. Statutory
preemption cases, for example, which may require the Court to construe a state statute to determine if
it conflicts in some way with federal law, generally do not receive this particular code as they do not
involve constitutional judicial review. In fact, of the eighteen cases I coded as involving a state law,
only nine were coded by Spaeth as involving judicial review of state action or law. And the code is
overinclusive in that it identifies cases in which the state action being reviewed is not a statute or
ordinance but is, for example, some action taken by an executive or law enforcement official or a
ruling of a state court.
207. Three were not mentioned at all, and one was mentioned but not in a numbered holding.
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distributions of the types of legal provisions that the Database failed to
identify.

Table E: Legal Provisions Unidentified in Original Database
Location of legal provisions

State Law

Other Legal
Provisions

Total

In Syllabus

14

27

41

In Syllabus but Not Explicit

0

16

16

In Syllabus but Not in Numbered
holding*

1

4

5

In an Opinion, but Not in
Syllabus*

3

10

13

In an Opinion, but Case Has No
Syllabus

0

7

7

In Questions Presented Only*

0

14

14

Miscellaneous*

0

3

3

Total

18

81

99

*Not encompassed in Spaeth’s coding protocols.

In all, 57.6% of the legal provisions that the Recoding Project
identified but that were not in the Original Database (and not including
legal doctrines and seminal cases, which the Database did not recognize)
were mentioned in a numbered holding of the syllabus. It is unclear why
the Database fails to code so many legal provisions that in fact fall
squarely within its coding protocols. As I explained in Part I, my best
guess is that, despite Spaeth’s claims to the contrary, he unavoidably
must make judgments about whether to actually record many of the legal
provisions referred to in the syllabus. But whatever the explanation, that
he in fact fails to record a significant number of such legal provisions
belies his claims that looking to the syllabi is a more reliable way to code
than is looking to the opinions themselves.
This finding is particularly significant in light of the Database’s
systematic underreporting of legal issues. If the Database could be relied
on for comprehensive and accurate reporting of legal provisions, that
would go a long way to make up for the limitations in the issue code
(although even then researchers would have to understand the
importance of using both codes). My findings indicate, however, that
Spaeth misses about half of the legal provisions considered or relied on
by the opinions. Between the missing legal provisions and the missing
legal issues and issue areas, even a researcher relying on a combination
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of legal issue and legal provision to identify or analyze particular types of
cases cannot rely on the Database for comprehensive information. Even
the approach taken by Epstein and Segal, for example—identifying all
cases that have a First Amendment issue code or have the First
Amendment coded as a legal provision—cannot be relied on to produce
an accurate or comprehensive list of cases involving the First
Amendment.

IV. Implications for Future Research
The analysis and findings presented in this Article raise two types of
implications for future research: First, how and when can researchers rely
on the Database as it currently exists or, relatedly, rely on research that
itself relies on the Database? Second, what lessons do my findings
provide for one of the greatest challenges of empirical legal
scholarship—coding complex and multifaceted cases in ways that are
comprehensive, reliable, and accurate, and that account for legal doctrine
and legal analysis. This Part addresses each of these questions in turn.
A. Using the Database
Researchers will—and should—continue to rely on the Database,
but it should not be used uncritically for every purpose. Researchers
interested in a particular area of law, for example, should not assume
that the Database provides a comprehensive or accurate list of cases in
that area—even if they rely on both issue and legal provision codes. As
the discussion of Epstein and Segal’s Trumping the First Amendment
illustrates, the limitations of the Database have the potential to render
unreliable the results of some such research projects. On the other hand,
a research project that deals with cases at a very high level of
generality—lumping together a host of issue areas under the rubric of
“civil liberties,” for example—is more likely to be reliable.
Researchers should not use the Database as currently constructed to
investigate interactions between different areas of law. The deliberate
decision to code only one issue per case, combined with the Database’s
underreporting of legal provisions, masks information about how and
when the Court deals with cases that involve more than one area of law.
Likewise, researchers should not draw conclusions from the fact that
there are very few cases in the Database coded with more than one issue
or with more than one legal provision.
Consumers of empirical legal research, even if they do not
themselves undertake such work, should also keep these concerns in
mind in evaluating empirical research. How does a particular study
identify the cases that it focuses on? What claims does it make about
those cases? If it does rely on the Database, does it discuss or otherwise
address concerns about that reliance?
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This Article addresses only three variables in detail, but the same
critical analysis should be applied to any project that relies on other
substantive variables from the Database. Such other variables include
those identifying, for example, the authority for the Court’s action
(statutory interpretation, judicial review, etc.) and the types of parties
involved in the case. Ultimately, there is no substitute for a careful and
thoughtful reading of the Codebook, even for researchers who do not
themselves engage in empirical analysis.
B. Creating New Resources
The Recoding Project offers some insights into some of the
challenges and opportunities presented by efforts to create new
resources that take a more nuanced approach to law. For example, as
scholars consider how to take account of law and legal doctrine in
quantitative empirical analysis, we may want to rethink the familiar
categories of the Spaeth Database. I suspect, based in part on my own
recoding efforts, that the distinction between legal provision and legal
issue, for example, may not be useful, particularly as we take account of
judge-made or judge-elaborated doctrines like qualified immunity or
208
preemption.
Scholars must also address problems of specificity. For example,
Spaeth often codes an entire statute when particular aspects of it are at
issue. While such coding is adequate for some analyses, some researchers
may want to address, for example, how the Court approaches statutes
that Congress has amended—comparing for example habeas corpus law
209
in light of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
210
or Title VII in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Identifying habeas
corpus or Title VII as the legal provision does not identify such cases.
Similarly, in some cases, the Court may compare or address different
parts or sections of the same statute. Spaeth’s current coding is unlikely
to capture such cases.
Scholars may also find it useful to identify legal issues in a particular
case in terms of their relationships to each other. In Markman, for
211
example, a single question —whether a judge or a jury is responsible for
patent claims construction—can be accurately characterized as both a
patent issue and a Seventh Amendment jury right issue. Yet these
different issues are not different legal analyses that the Court had to

208. Additionally, identifying “seminal cases” appears to be particularly challenging. When I had
twenty cases independently recoded, the recoders identified substantially more such cases than I did.
See infra Appendix 1.
209. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28,
and 42 U.S.C.).
210. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
211. 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
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resolve, but rather identify the bodies of law involved in the case. In
other cases, such as Reeves, Leatherman, and Swierkiewicz, the legal
issues involved may explicitly have to do with the way, for example,
Rules of Civil Procedure apply in a particular area of law, such as
employment discrimination, or how they interact with established
doctrine. In yet other cases, the legal issues presented might be
completely distinct from each other—a case that first addresses a
standing question and then moves on to reach the merits, for example.
Similarly, it could be very valuable to identify types or methods of legal
analysis—if a particular case involves statutory interpretation, for
example, what interpretive approaches are used by the different
212
opinions.
Relatedly, scholars seeking to create replicable, reliable, and
comprehensive data may find that advances in database architecture and
technology make possible more complex coding. Tagging, for example,
allows a database to identify multiple and evolving aspects of the data.
There is no inherent limit to the number of tags that can be attached to a
particular case. So scholars can add information about, say, the use of
canons of statutory interpretation, without disturbing preexisting data.
Similarly, as new legal or public policy issues come to the forefront of
public and legal consciousness—issues related to the federal
government’s response to terrorist threats, for example—those issues
could be identified, again without the need to remove or omit
information about other issues.
Of course, the more nuanced and detailed a coding regime for case
law, the more likely it is to involve subjective determinations, meaning
that different coders might code the same case differently. Such
difficulties may limit the level of detail that a multi-user database can
213
realistically provide. The issue codes created for the Original Database
and the similar codes that I developed for the Recoding Project may be
too detailed (at least in some issue areas) to be functional in the long run.
The broader issue area codes, on the other hand, may be too general to
provide necessary information for many scholars. But the difficulty of
212. Tiller and Cross have proposed some interesting ideas for getting at this kind of multilayered
legal analysis. See generally Tiller & Cross, supra note 17; see also Epstein et al., supra note 40, at 322
(“[While] social scientists code cases addressing the Internal Revenue Code as involving one issue:
‘federal taxation[,]’ [t]his description . . . ignores all the subsidiary questions the Court may have
addressed, including problems of statutory interpretation, concerns about the federal budget or the
national economy, and general notions of equity and efficiency.”).
213. One potential approach worth further investigation would be to turn to the West Key
Number System. This System has the potential to provide at least some of the detail missing from the
Database, as it is geared towards practicing lawyers who might be interested in any number of aspects
of a given case, and so aims for more comprehensive coding than the Database. On the other hand, the
level of detail provided appears to vary greatly from case to case, with some cases identified by many,
often repetitive keys, and others identified by only the most general.
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finding the right balance between detail and reliability does not justify
continued uncritical use of a resource that, as I have shown, provides so
little detail that findings based upon it often cannot be trusted.

Conclusion
Although this Article highlights the limitations of the Original
Supreme Court Database, my purpose is not simply to criticize this pillar
of empirical legal research. To the contrary, I embarked on this project
out of necessity. My own first attempts to use the Database to investigate
aspects of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence were stymied by the
Database’s structure, and by the substantial and important information
that was omitted.
Yet I also found that some scholars who use and rely on the
Database or on findings that emerge from it simply do not appreciate its
limitations, even as the Database’s influence and ubiquity grows. That
the Database is so widely used is not a reason to continue to rely on it
uncritically. It is, if anything, a reason not to. If scholars do not—at a
minimum—take into account the Database’s limitations in devising their
research strategies, their findings will often be unreliable.
My hope is that this Article will contribute to increased
understanding and communication between positive empirical scholars—
primarily political scientists—and legal academics, and that it will prompt
increased research and experimentation. Until empirical scholarship
takes account of law, legal doctrine, and legal analysis, many of its
insights will—and should—be viewed with skepticism by more traditional
legal scholars. The two enterprises must find a way to strengthen each
other. This Article is an attempt to begin to do just that.
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Appendix 1: Methodology of the Recoding Project
I began the Recoding Project with a 10% random sample drawn
(using Stata) from the cases decided during the last Rehnquist Natural
Court—the last eleven years of the Rehnquist court, during which there
214
This sample contained ninety-five
were no personnel changes.
individual cases, which are listed in Appendix 2. I define an individual
215
case as an opinion with a unique case citation (analu=0). I included
only cases with published opinions, but I did not limit the sample to cases
that were orally argued or even to cases that had an opinion of the Court.
I also created a codebook. In many respects, I followed Spaeth’s
database architecture and coding protocols, but I added a number of new
variables and changed the definitions of several others. My goals in
recoding were severalfold. First, I wanted to test the scope of the
problems I identified with the Database. For this reason, I wanted my
coding to be fairly comparable to Spaeth’s. Second, and in some tension
with the first goal, I wanted to code information in the cases more
accurately and comprehensively. Finally, I wanted to develop insights
into the challenges of operationalizing law, with the expectation that the
lessons learned in this project would be useful to myself and others in the
future.
I. Variables
For purposes of this Article, the most important variables were legal
provision, issue and issue area. The changes I made to these variables are
described in more detail below.
A. Legal Provision
For this variable, I wanted to find ways of coding more accurately
than by simply looking at the syllabus or other summaries. I concluded
that the first place to look should be the Questions Presented (QPs)—
available on Westlaw for most argued cases, at least during the last
Rehnquist Natural Court. The QPs are the formal questions on which the
Supreme Court agrees to hear argument when it grants certiorari.
Therefore, they provide information about how the lawyers understood
what the case was about and how they presented it to the Court.
The Court does not necessarily answer every QP, however.
Sometimes, it concludes that it does not need to reach some or all of QPs
in a particular case in order to adequately resolve it, for example, or
sometimes the Court deals with the case in front of it on completely

214. I drew the sample originally for a project that, due to the Database’s limitations, I was unable
to complete.
215. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 3.
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different grounds—making a jurisdictional ruling, for example, or
dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. And even
when the Court does answer all of the QPs, it sometimes finds it
unnecessary to address every legal provision identified. Conversely, the
Court may address some legal provisions that were not mentioned in the
QPs. Therefore, the coding was not limited to legal provisions mentioned
in the QPs, but also extended to the opinions themselves.
Initially, I defined legal provision as a statute, constitutional
provision, legal doctrine, or seminal case that is squarely raised or
implicated by the QPs as well as discussed or relied on by one of the
opinions. After a while, however, it became clear that a legal provision
simply mentioned in an opinion was often not necessarily worth coding. I
narrowed the scope of the variable to include any legal provision
216
construed or relied on by any opinion.
My definition of legal provision is broader than Spaeth’s in that I
included legal doctrine or seminal cases as legal provisions. I did this
primarily to see if it would be possible to report more accurate
information in this manner. Determining what constitutes a seminal case
or a legal doctrine, however, was not easy. My codebook provided:
If the opinion [or Question Presented] discusses [a] case in order to
distinguish it (or refuse to distinguish it), the case is probably not a
legal provision. If, on the other hand, the opinion discusses the case in
terms of the application of a legal doctrine that the case stands for,
217
then the case is probably a legal provision.
218

For example, in Missouri v. Seibert, the Court considered the
application of two precedents. The first was the famous case of Miranda
219
v. Arizona, which announced the requirement that a suspect in police
custody be warned about his right to remain silent before being
220
questioned. The second case was Elstad v. Oregon. In Elstad, the Court
held that where a suspect responded to uncoercive questions without
having been given his Miranda warnings, a subsequent statement, made
221
after warnings were made, was admissible. In Seibert, the police
deliberately withheld Miranda warnings from the suspect in the hopes
that having made incriminating statements once, she would be more
222
likely to do so again after the warnings were given.
216. See Carolyn Shapiro, Codebook for Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical
Analysis of the Supreme Court 1 (2009), available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/shapiro/faces/
study/StudyPage.jsp?studyId=38080&tab=files (follow “download” hyperlink located to the right of
“Coding Complexity Codebook.pdf”).
217. Id. at 3.
218. 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
219. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
220. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
221. Id. at 318.
222. 542 U.S. at 618. There were also other differences between the factual circumstances of the
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Seibert, then, is about whether to extend Elstad to a slightly different
factual situation or whether to distinguish it. Therefore, I did not identify
Elstad as a legal provision. But as the case also involved Miranda
warnings. arising from the paradigmatic seminal case of Miranda v.
Arizona, that case (or the doctrine that arose from it) was identified as a
223
legal provision.
224
Another example of a seminal case is Mathews v. Eldridge, the
three-decades-old case that set forth a widely-used balancing test for
procedural due process claims. Courts use this balancing test to
determine what process is due when a plaintiff alleges a deprivation of
property or liberty without adequate process. The test requires the Court
to balance the nature of the individual’s interest; the risks of erroneous
deprivations under current procedure; and the government interests at
225
stake, including the burdens and costs of superior procedure. Three
cases in my sample involved Mathews v. Eldridge.
For legal doctrine and seminal cases alike, my codebook also
provided that case or doctrine names should be added where they are a
226
significant way to label a legal issue. One recurrent legal doctrine is
qualified immunity (coded as QI). Spaeth himself codes a few legal
doctrines or seminal cases as legal provisions, including Miranda (5AMI)
227
and res judicata (RJ).

B. Issue and Issue Area
Instead of defining an “issue” as the “public policy context” of a
case, I coded for legal issues. I explained legal issues this way: “[I]magine
that you are trying to describe the case to a first year law student. You
want the student to understand what the case is about and what areas of
228
law it implicates.” I did not put any upper limit on the number of legal
issues or issue areas that could be coded for any particular case.
Instead of making issue area derivative of issue, I identified the issue
area first. The same (or very related) issues therefore might occur in
different issue areas in my coding, but not in Spaeth’s.
I created a number of issue areas that did not previously exist: (1)
Federal Government Operations and Structure; (2) State/Local
Government Operations and Structure; (3) Intellectual Property; (4)
Environment; (5) Immigration; (6) Native Americans; (7) Military. I also
two cases, which the Seibert court noted. Id. at 615–16.
223. See supra note 97 (noting that Spaeth himself recognizes the Miranda doctrine as a legal
provision).
224. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
225. Id. at 335.
226. See Shapiro, supra note 216, at 3.
227. Codebook 2008, supra note 28, at 35, 38.
228. Shapiro, supra note 216, at 5.
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renamed and expanded two issue areas. Attorneys became Lawyers and
Legal Profession and Unions became Employment. In addition, I
rearranged some of Spaeth’s coding, moving issues to different areas
when I felt it appropriate, and creating new issue codes.
In perhaps the most dramatic alteration, I eliminated the Database’s
“privacy” issue area. I placed issues related to abortion and other
substantive due process concerns in the due process issue area, and I
moved issues related to privacy statutes, like the Freedom of Information
Act, to Federal Government Operations and Structure, a new issue area.
Table F summarizes the major changes that I made in the definitions and
contents of issue areas.

Table F: Major Changes to Issues and Issue Area
Original Issue
Areas

My Issue Areas

Notes

Criminal
Procedure

Criminal Law
and Procedure

Largely the same, with some rearranged and new
codes

Civil Rights

Civil Rights

Largely the same, with some rearranged and new
codes

First
Amendment

First
Amendment

Largely the same, with some rearranged and new
codes

Due Process

Due Process

Substantive due process codes, including abortion
were moved here from the Original Database’s
privacy issue area

Privacy

DELETED

Moved to due process and federal government
operations and structure

Federal
Government
Operations and
Structure

Under this issue area, I included codes having to do
with executive and congressional power,
administrative law, government liability, and
FOIA. Most of these codes were new; a handful
were imported from preexisting issue areas

State/Local
Government
Operations and
Power

Under this issue area, I included codes having to do
with state and local government activities and
powers. Most were new codes, but two —state
regulation of business and zoning, constitutional—
were imported from the Original Database’s
preexisting issue areas

Federalism

Federalism

Largely the same, but with additional codes related
to the 10th and 11th amendments, to constitutional
preemption, ERISA, and the spending clause

Interstate
Relations

Interstate
Relations

Largely the same

Attorneys

Legal Profession
and Lawyering

Most of the codes in this issue area were either in
the Original Database’s Attorneys issue area or
were newly created. For example, I created a code
for alternative dispute resolution, misc.
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My Issue Areas

Notes

Unions

Employment

I greatly expanded the codes available to describe
legal issues arising from the employer-employee
relationship. For example, I added codes for
minimum wage, child labor, health insurance, and
workers compensation

Economic
Activity

Other Economic
Activity

Because I removed some codes from this issue
area, I renamed it to make clear that it is not
comprehensive

Intellectual
Property

Some codes were imported from economic activity;
some were new

Environment

These codes were primarily new

Judicial Power

Judicial Power

Largely the same

Federal Taxation

Federal Taxation

Largely the same

Immigration

These codes were largely imported from Civil
Rights

Native
Americans

Some codes were imported from Civil Rights; some
were new

Military

Most of these codes were imported from Civil
Rights

Miscellaneous

DELETED

II. Database Architecture
Each record identified a single legal provision, with multiple issues
and issue areas. There was no limit to the number of records a case could
have, so multiple legal provisions could be coded. The number of records
(that is, the number of legal provisions) per case was also coded, as was
the number of issues and issue areas per case.
III. Coding Process
Initially, I assigned the coding to two second-year law students. I
asked them each to code all ninety-five cases in the sample. My original
hope was to do minimal recoding myself. As I reviewed and compared
the students’ coding, however, it became clear that there were several
sources of mistakes that I had not anticipated. In many instances, for
example, accurately coding the cases required background knowledge
about different areas of law, knowledge that my law student coders did
not always have. Ultimately, I recoded all of the cases myself, although I
used their work to ensure that I did not omit issues and legal provisions.
Additionally, it was sometimes necessary to add issue codes. Although
the coders proposed some additions to me during their work—most of
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which I adopted—I found it necessary to add a few new codes myself
during the recoding, and I made necessary revisions to the codebook.

IV. Intercoder Reliability
Following completion of the Recoding Project, two independent
recoders (law professors Matthew Sag and David Franklin) each recoded
a random sample of ten cases each. I then compared the legal provision
and issue area coding for the twenty independently coded cases with my
229
recoding using Cohen’s Kappa. This measure showed moderate to
substantial agreement in the legal provision coding and substantial
230
agreement in the issue area coding.
Both of the recoders were significantly more generous in identifying
231
cases as legal provisions than I was. Therefore, I figured this Cohen’s
Kappa twice—once including all of the cases they identified and once
excluding them.
Table G: Legal Provision Agreement: Including Cases
Agreement

Expected
Agreement

Kappa

Std. Err.

Z

Prob. > Z

51.35%

6.36%

0.4805

0.0253

19.00

0.0000

Table H: Legal Provision Agreement: Excluding Cases
Agreement
63.33%

Expected
Agreement
5.00%

Kappa

Std. Err.

Z

Prob. > Z

0.6140

0.0269

22.82

0.0000

229. Cohen’s Kappa is a statistical comparison of the coding of the same items by different coders,
taking into account the level of agreement that would occur purely by chance. “If Kappa equals 0 then
the amount of agreement between the two coders is exactly what one would expect by chance. If
Kappa equals 1, then the coders agree perfectly.” James F. Spriggs II & Thomas G. Hansford,
Measuring Legal Change: The Reliability and Validity of Shepard’s Citations, 53 Pol. Res. Q. 327, 334
n.11 (2000) (citing Jacob Cohen, A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales, 20 Educ. & Psychol.
Measurement 37 (1960)).
230. 2 Stata Base Reference Manual: Release 9, at 2 (2005) (citing J.R. Landis & G.G. Koch,
The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data, 33 Biometrics 159, 165 (1977))
(offering these interpretations).
231. In looking at agreement on legal provision, I looked for substantive agreement. So, for
example, if the recoder identified two sections of one large statute, and my recoding identified that
large statute, I counted that coding as a single match. To calculate Cohen’s Kappa, I created one row
per case for each unique legal provision identified in the case. Where both the recoder and I identified
the same legal provision, both were identified in that row. Where the recoder identified a legal
provision that I did not, I put a dummy code in the column for my coding, and vice versa. Note that
this approach understates the intercoder agreement, as it fails to capture the myriad legal provisions
that the recoder and I both agreed not to include.
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232

Table I: Issue Area Agreement
Agreement
92.22%

Expected
Agreement
78.42%

Kappa

Std. Err.

Z

Prob. > Z

0.6396

0.0513

12.48

0.0000

232. To calculate this measure, I made one row per case for each issue area. For twenty recoded
cases, and eighteen issue areas, there were 360 rows. For each row, I created two dichotomous
variables—one each for my coding and for the recoder. I calculated Cohen’s Kappa based on the
match between these variables.
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Appendix 2: Cases in Recoding Sample
L.Ed.2d Cite

Case Name and U.S. Reports Cite

1

130/0219

Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5 (1994)

2

130/0454

Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994)
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S.

3

130/1024

4

131/0324

5

131/0395

Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995)

6

131/0403

Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995)

7

131/0532

Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995)

8

133/0578

Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996)

9

133/0611

Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235 (1996)

10

134/0034

Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hiles, 516 U.S. 400 (1996)

11

134/0577

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)

12

135/0036

Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996)

13

135/0248

Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996)

14

135/0843

Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996)

15

136/0347

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996)

16

136/0696

Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997)

17

137/0001

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997)

18

137/0041

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997)

19

137/0055

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997)

20

137/0063

Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997)

21

137/0093

Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465 (1997)

22

137/0281

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)

23

137/0945

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)

24

137/0980

Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997)

25

138/0091

Lords Landing Vill. Condo. Council of Unit Owners v. Cont’l Ins. Co.,
520 U.S. 893 (1997)

26

138/0120

Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997)

27

138/0162

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997)

28

138/0285

Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997)

29

138/0914

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)

30

139/0433

Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75 (1997)

31

139/0702

Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998)

32

140/0350

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)

33

140/0542

Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 382 (1998)

527 (1995)
Whitaker v. Superior Court, 514 U.S. 208 (1995)

538

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

L.Ed.2d Cite

[Vol. 60:477

Case Name and U.S. Reports Cite

34

140/0759

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998)

35

140/0875

Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998)

36

140/0970

Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998)

37

141/0222

Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214 (1998)

38

142/0599

Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999)

39

143/0818

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999)

40

144/0067

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)

41

144/0347

Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)

42

144/0494

Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999)

43

146/0236

Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000)

44

146/0374

Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000)

45

146/0530

Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000)

46

146/0542

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000)

47

146/0561

Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000)

48

146/0707

Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000)

49

147/0105

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)

50

147/0374

Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000)

51

148/0373

Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000)

52

148/0576

Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)

53

149/0164

TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001)

54

149/0430

Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001)

55

149/0590

Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001)
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424

56

149/0674

57

151/0489

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001)

58

151/0659

Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 534 U.S. 235 (2002)

59

151/0820

Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002)

60

152/0437

United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002)

61

152/0701

Verizon Commc’n, Inc. v. F.C.C., 535 U.S. 467 (2002)

62

152/0888

Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002)

63

153/0027

Delvin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002)

64

154/0491

Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002)

65

154/0501

Abdur’rahman v. Bell, 537 U.S. 88 (2002)

66

154/0588

Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003)

67

154/0653

Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003)

68

155/0001

Moseley v. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003)

(2001)
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L.Ed.2d Cite

Case Name and U.S. Reports Cite

69

155/0017

Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2003)

70

155/0164

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)

71

155/0376

Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216 (2003)

72

155/0535

Virginia. v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)

73

155/0793

Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemktg. Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003)

74

155/0933

Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003)

75

155/0946

City of L.A. v. David, 538 U.S. 715 (2003)

76

155/1017

Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803 (2003)

77

156/0544

Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003)

78

157/0112

Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004)

79

158/0291

Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004)

80

158/0450

Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfenning, 541 U.S. 232 (2004)

81

158/0659

Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386 (2004)

82

158/0764

Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004)

83

158/0787

Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004)

84

159/0548

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)

85

159/0578

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)

86

159/0643

Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004)

87

160/0611

Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005)

88

161/0066

Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005)

89

161/0563

Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320 (2005)

90

161/0651

Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005)

91

161/0876

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005)

92

161/0953

Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2000)

93

162/0407

94

162/0418

95

162/0982

Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429
(2005)
Mid-Con Freight Sys., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 440
(2005)
Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005)

